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PRINTED ON WHI~E  01LORINE·FRE£ PAPER Europe's energy position- 2010 Annual Report Dear Reader, 
It is my pleasure to present the 2010 Annual Report of  the Market Observatory for Energy of the European Commission. 
Th1s IS the third annual report on Europe's energy position, following our  previous editions in 2008 and 2009. 
The report focuses on the period from early 2009 to mid-2010. Cnergy  markets witnessed a slow but gradual 
recovery from their lows reached  in the early months of 2009. However, Europe faces major challenges in the 
forthcoming decade. 
Energy is a key component in our welfare and our competitiveness. It is also fundamental to climate change policies. 
Major investment decisions of strategic importance need to be taken urgently to deliver our political goals and 
ensure that markets can continue to provide reliable and affordable energy. The Commission's new Energy 2020 
Strategy will help create the confidence and stability to underpin these investment decisions. 
Based on the strategy, the Commission will take forward European initiatives for energy efficiency, open and 
integrated energy markets, diversified and smart energy networks and a strong international profile. We are also 
developing longer term strategies to largely decarbonise our energy by 2050. European energy policy will help 
ensure that our economy functions with the cleanest and most efficient technologies, fully exploits indigenous 
energy resources at our disposal and assures reliable supplies and competitive energy prices to all  European 
consumers. 
Gunther H. Oettinger 
European Commissioner for Energy 1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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80 The third annual report of  the Market Observatory for Energy 
focuses on the main developments of the energy markets in 
Europe. Including 2008 and 2009 statistical data, it  represents 
Europe's energy position and it  contains a detailed description 
of  the evolution of  energy production, final consumption, the 
energy mix and the uses of energy for different purposes '. 
These elements are presented In a time frame stretching from 
January 2009 to September 2010, thus including a period with 
large amplitudes in price  movements, followed by market 
consolidation. Some countries outside the European Union 
which have relevance in energy relations with the countries of 
the EU are also presented in this report, mainly from the angle 
of  their influence on the energy position of  the Union. 
The deepest point  of  rhe economic recession for the Member 
States of  the European Union and the major world economies 
occurred  at the beginning  of 2009.  After a  period of 
consolidation, the EU economy starred to recover and by the 
end of  the second quarter of  2010 most of  the Member States 
were out of recession. However, in the late spring of 2010 
when financial problems in some countries of  the euro-zone 
became apparent, the volatility of currency and commodity 
markets rose again and fears of a double-dip of the world 
economy became stronger. 
These macro-economic developments provide the framework 
for the current report, which looks  at the  impact of the 
economic crisis and recovery on the EU's energy positions and 
markets. In summary, the following Important developments 
took place during the period observed: 
1.  Gradual decrease of the EU  gross inland consumption 
of energy continued in 2009 and the first half of 2010. 
While  the  decoupling  of GDP  growth  and  energy 
consumption  which had already been observed prior to 
the reported period was confirmed, there were indications 
that the recent recession accelerated the pace of  reduction 
in consumption of  energy. 
2. During the period observed, the share of  the major energy 
sources I carriers in the energy mix remained stable, with 
solid  fuels  registering  a  small  decrease  and  that of 
renewable energy sources progressing further; the decline 
in energy supply from domestic sources was greater than 
the reduction in gross inland consumption as  energy 
companies  had  to face  the combined  challenge  of 
economic slowdown and gradual depletion of production 
fields; the climate performance of the EU  energy sector 
improved in 2009; greenhouse gas emissions and energy 
intensity fell for a seventh year in a row. 
3.  In 2009, the euro appreciated by 5%  with respea to the US 
dollar While the exchange rate mitigated somewhat the 
variation effect of  crude oil prices on European consumers, 
the price  of Brent still registered a record year-on-year 
increase in December 2009 from the low point reached a 
year before. In 2009, the demand and supply of  crude oil 
fell on average by roughly 1.4  million barrels  per day. 
Despite  an  unstable  economic  environment  and 
uncertainties on the supply and demand side, the price of 
crude remained stable For most of 2009. Final prices of 
refined products, such as gasoline, diesel and heating 011 , 
Followed similar developments but were relatively less 
volatile  than crude oil, while variations in costs  and 
distribution  margins  remained  in  line with the two 
previous years. 
4. According to the most recent data available, the supply/ 
demand imbalance for diesel and gasoline has widened. 
further increasing  the  EU's  dependence on trade of 
petroleum products. In recent years, the  EU refining sector 
has had to cope with the challenges of  developing more 
costly and complex refining capacity primarily in order to 
meet a growing demand for middle distillates as the EU 
crude diet has become progressively heavier and more 
sulphurous. 
5. The difficult economic conditions were also affecting the 
traditional  relations between suppliers,  shippers  and 
consumers of natural gas  In Europe. Two gas  disputes 
involving producing and transiting countries occurred In 
the 18  months covering 2009 and the nrst half of 2010. 
Both  happened  outside  of the  EU  but  impacted 
consumers  from  the  Member  States. These  events 
prompted the Commission into action with new regulation 
for security of  supply coming into force in December 2010. 
6.  In 2009 and 2010, the decline in domestic production of 
natural gas exceeded the reduction of the gross 1 nland 
consumption  The  relative  part of LNG  continued to 
increase in the EU import mix. Spot volumes of  traded gas 
increased despite the economic slowdown. In general, 
market participants were taking on arbitrage opportunities 
by adjusting the utilisation rates on interconnection points 
whenever short term premium emerged. As long term 
contract gas priced against lagged values of  crude and 
refined products, margins between long term contract 
and spot gas widened significantly, prompting holders of 
long term contracts to seek to renegotiate I Introduce 
stronger flexibility clauses In  the existing contracts by 
reducing the take or pay obligations. 
(I) Wherever lr is possible, rhe Annual Report uses rhe laresr available EU offidal  srarlsrical dora complemented wirh market data sources 
or  those of  orher odminisrrarive dora providers. 
(2) Decoupling occu"ed  in borh 2007 and 2008 as GOP growth was no/ accomponied by  increasing energy consumption, 
rather  a slight  decrease could be  observed in  gross inland energy consumption. See Chapter 2. I.  I. 7.  The process of integration of the EU electricity wholesale 
markets  continued  in  2009  and  2010  with  several 
important  developments taking place  in the observed 
period. Traded volumes  and liquidity on the organised 
exchanges and on the over-the-counter market improved. 
As wholesale prices of  adjacent areas started to align, the 
combined volumes of exports and imports of  electricity 
registered a small decrease. 
Several  important legislative acts  were  adopted in  the 
observed period. In July 2009 the European Parliament and 
the Council adopted the so-called Third  Legislative Package 
of the energy domain that contains several regulations and 
directives  aiming at improving  the functioning  of the 
European internal energy market, including: 
>  Two directives which lay down the common rules of the 
functioning of the internal electricity and gas  market 
in the EU. 
>  Two regulations which lay down rules on conditions for 
access to networks for cross border trading of electricity 
and gas and establishing two important institutions: the 
European  Network of Transmission System  Operators 
(ENTSO) for electricity and gas.  The role of  these entities is 
to ensure  the optimal  management of  transmission 
networks and to allow cross  border  trade or electricity 
and gas. 
>  A  regulation  which  establishes  the Agency  for the 
Cooperation of  Energy Regulators (ACER). To become fully 
operational as of March 2011, ACER will perform, among 
other important  tasks, the coordination of the work of 
the national regulatory authorities. 
Furthermore, in April 2009 a Directive (2009/28/EU) on the 
promotion of the use or energy from renewable sources was 
adopted. In May 2010 a recast of  two other directives  was 
adopted: the Directive (2010/30/EU) on indication by labelling 
and standard product information of the consumption of 
energy and other energy related resources and the Directive 
(2010/31/EU) on the energy performance of houses. 
In addition, in June 2010 a new legislation was adopted on the 
notification to  the Commission of investment projects in 
energy infrastructure within the European Union. This should 
increase transparency on the structural evolution of the EU 
energy system and enhance the ability of EU  institutions to 
anticipate problems. 
(3) EU No 994/201 0. 
In October 2010 the Council and the European Parliament 
adopted  a  new  regulation "  concerning  measures  to 
safeguard  security of gas  supply and  repealing Council 
Directive 2004/67/EC. This regulation establishes provisions 
aimed at safeguarding the security of  gas supply by ensuring 
the proper and continuous functioning of  the internal market 
in natural gas, by allowing for exceptional measures to be 
implemented when the market can no longer deliver the 
required gas supplies. The regulation entered Into force on 
200 December 2010. 
In November 2010 the European Commission published a 
Communication  entitled  'Energy  2020:  A  strategy  for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy' which defines the 
energy priorities for the next ten years and sets the actions to 
be taken in order to tackle the challenges of  saving energy, 
achieving a  market with competitive prizes  and secure 
supplies, boosting technological leadership, and effectively 
negotiate with our international partners. 
At the same time the European Commission also adopted a 
Communication entitled 'Energy infrastructure priorities for 
2020 and beyond', in which it defines EU priority corridors for 
the transport  of electricity,  gas and oil.  A toolbox is  also 
proposed in order to enable a timely Implementation of  these 
priority infrastructures. 
The final Chapter of the Annual Report looks into the energy 
sectors of the United States or America, Canada, Qatar and 
Libya, which are among the most important energy trading 
partners of  the EU. 2.1.  EU ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
2.1.1.  Total energy consumption 
Energy consumption decreased slightly in 2008 compared to 
the previous year, similarly to the consumption evolution in 
2007. In 2008, gross inland energy consumption in the EU-27 
was 1799 Mtoe while it was 1806 Mtoe in 2007 and 1826 Mtoe 
in 2006. 2008 annual data provide further confirmation that 
the growing trend of energy consumption has been reversed. 
2008 consumption, down by 0.5% from 2007, was lower than 
in 2003 (1803 Mtoe). 
FIGURE 1 
Final energy consumption  showed a slight upturn in 2008, 
Increasing by 0.3 %. In 2008, total final energy consumption 
was  1168 Mtoe while it was  1164  Mtoe in 2007. 2008 final 
consumption remained close to the 2003 level. The diverging 
evolution of  gross inland consumption and final consumption 
of energy  may  be  explained  by  decreasing  energy 
transformation losses (between 2007 and 2008 transformation 
losses diminished from 404 Mtoe to 397 Mtoe). 
EU-27, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION AND FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1990-2008) 
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According to preliminary data, a significant decrease occurred 
in gross inland energy consumption in 2009 (5.5 %), wh1ch 
coincides with the consequences of the looming economic 
crisis (e.g.: drop in the GOP of the EU-27 by 4.2% between 
2008 and 2009). It is worth noting that the decrease of the 
gross  inland consumpt1on  was larger than that of GOP. 
pointing to a further Improvement in energy efficiency of 
the EU-27 economy. 
2.1.2.  The flow of energy 
The chart on the following page shows the flow of  energy in 
the economy using 2008 annual data. From the input (supply) 
side,  the two most important sources are  the Indigenous 
(4) Based on  2008 Eurosror dora ond an pravisional2009 Eurostat dota. 
Source: Eurostot 
(primary) production and the Import of energy. The supply 
serves the purposes of Gross inland consumption and the 
Export of energy products. Gross  inland consumption 
includes Bunkers and Changes in energy stocks. If all Losses 
(Transmission  and DiscribuCiOn)  and Consumption of the 
energy sector are eliminated, the amount of Energy for final 
consumption can be obtained. 
After eliminating Final non-energy consumption the amount 
of Fmal energy consumption  remains.  This  is  distributed 
among the different sectors  of the economy (Industry, 
Transporr, Households, Services and other seaors). 
(5) Fino/ energy consumption Includes oil  energy delivered to final consumers In the lndusrry, tronsporr, household  ond  ather sectors for oil  energy uses. 
lr excludes deliveries for rronsformarion and/or  own  use of  rhe energy produong mdustries, as well as network  losses. FIGURE 2 
EU-27, FLOW OF ENERGY {in Mtoe) (2008) 
2.1.3.  Gross inland consumption and energy mix 
With  a  36.5%  share  in gross  inland consumption (and 
amounting to 656 Mtoe), oil remained the most used energy 
source in the EU in 2008. This value does not show significant 
change compared to that of 2007 and according to 2009 
monthly aggregated data, the share  of oil in  2009 also 
remained close  to this  value.  In  comparison, in  1990 oil 
represented 38.1 %of  total annual consumption. 
Natural gas consumption grew by 1.9% in 2008, to 440 Mtoe, 
which  is  slight ly  above  its  2006  level  when  annual 
consumption last recorded positive growth. Gas remained the 
second most used energy source in the EU in 2008 with a 
slightly increasing share in the energy mix (24.5 o/o in 2008; up 
from its 2007 value of  23.9%). 
Nuclear  energy consumption remained  stable in 2008 
(at 241  Mtoe), and its share in the energy mix In 2008 was 
13.4 o/o,  representing the fourth energy source in the EU-27 
gross inland consumption. According ro preliminary data"' of 
Eurostat, in 2009 the consumption of  natural gas fell by 5.8 %, 
while that of  nuclear energy  decreased by 2.8  %. 
In 2008, the trend of increasing solid fuel consumption that 
could be observed in the preceding three years was reversed, 
recording a significant drop compared to 2007. In 2008, it 
amounted to 306 Mtoe, I.e. -7 o/o in comparison with the 2007 
value of 329 Mtoe. This was the lowest annual consumption 
level since the end of  the 1990s. Solid fuels lost 1.3 pp in the 
energy mix but remained the third energy source with a 17% 
Source: Eurostot 
share in 2008. According to monthly aggregated data from 
Eurostat, in 2009 the consumption of  solid ruels experienced 
a  strong  decline (12.7%). This  Is  closely  related  to the 
reduction In demand of certain  Industrial  branches  and 
energy  production as  a  consequence of the economic 
crisis In 2009. 
The consumption in renewables (RES)  increased by 5.6% in 
2008, amounting to 151 Mtoe, compared to 143 Mtoe in 2007. 
RES consumption has  doubled since 1990. Its share in the 
energy mix represented 8.4% in 2008, compared to 7.8% in 
2007 and 7.1%  in 2006. RES remained the fifth largest energy 
source  of EU  gross  inland  consumption.  In  2009,  RES 
consumption further increased slightly, its share  in gross 
inland consumption of  energy rising by 0.6 pp to 9%. 
(6) 2009 preliminary dot  a of  Eurostat are computed  from monthly  data; the final 2009 annual data mfght  show deviations from these preliminary 
ones in  some cases, therefore the comparability of  final annua/2008 data and  that of  preliminary data of  2009 is limited. FlGURE 3 
EU-27, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION (in%) (2008) 
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Total = 1 799.29 Mtoe  Source:Eurostar 
In 2008, fossil fuels continued to dominate the energy mix. 
They represented 78% of EU-27 gross Inland consumption, 
decreasing slightly from the 2007 level (78.6%). Low-carbon 
energy sources (nuclear and renewables) amounted to 22% 
of EU gross inland consumption in 2008. 
2.1.4.  Final energy consumption by energy 
sources/products, sector and end use 
2.1.4.1.  Final energy consumption by  energy 
sources/products 
Between 2007 and 2008, EU-27  final consumption of solid 
fuels fell by 2.2 o/o while that of  oil and gas remained relatively 
stable (+0.1 o/o and +0.2 %, respectively or in absolute values 
+4.3 Mtoe for oil and +0.6 Mtoe for gas). Solids fuels have 
been on a constantly declining consumption path since 1990 
FIGURE4 
while oil (4844  Mtoe) and gas (269.1 Mtoe) consumption were 
close to their record high levels set in 2004. Colder weather 
and  high  energy  prices  also  conrributed  to  higher 
consumption. However,  final consumption of electricity 
(245 Mtoe or 2849 TWh) and that of  RES (68 Mtoe or  791 TWh) 
continued  increasing  respectively  by  12.8  TWh' I  0.4% 
and 40.7 TWh/ 5.4 %.  Legislation and policy initiatives  to 
mitigate climate change effects contributed to the growth 
of  RES consumption. 
Oil products remained the largest energy source used in the 
EU-27 in 2008 (41.4 %), followed by gas (23 %). However. their 
respective shares fell slightly by 0.5 pp for oil and by 0.2 pp for 
gas  compared to 2007.  The  share of electricity slightly 
declined by  0.1  pp while that of  RES rose by 0.3 pp. Solid fuels 
remained stable at  4.7% in 2008. 
EU-27, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL AND PRODUCT  (~n  %) (2008) 
Gas  13% 
Solid fuels  4.7% 
Derived heat  41.4%  Oil 
and Industrial 
waste  4% 
Renewables  5.8% 
Electricity  21 % 
Total = 1 168.64 Mtoe  Source:Eurostat 
(7) Increase in electricity and  renewable consumption values ore I.  I Mtoe and  3.5 Mtoe, re5pectively. In 2008, final energy consumption rose by 0.3% in the EU-15 
1000 Mtoe versus 997 Mtoe) compared to the previous year 
and by 0.6% in the EU-12 (169.1  Mtoe versus 168.1 Mtoe) 
during the same period. The main differences between the 
consumption patterns of  the EU-1 5 and the EU-12 concerned 
the  share  of oil  and  solid  fuels,  although  trends  are 
converging. In 2008, the share of oil  in  the final  energy 
consumption in  the EU-15  was  43.1 o/o,  down by 0.5  pp 
compared to 2007 while for the EU-12, i( was 31.7 o/o,  0.2 pp 
above 2007 levels. 
The share of  solid fuels was 8.4 pps higher in the EU-12 than in 
the EU-15 (with a share of  11.9% for the EU-12 and 3.5% for the 
EU-15)  due to  higher use  of  solid  fuels for  electricity 
generation and heat production in the EU-12. 
FIGURE 5/1 
In 2008, 56% of electricity in the EU-12 was produced from 
coal,  while it was only 22 o/o in the EU-15. In the case of both 
the EU-15  and the EU-12,  the importance of solid  fuels in 
power generation continued to decline. The EU-12 reduced its 
coal consumption share by 1.8 pp between 2007 and 2008 
while during the same period the share of solid fuels for 
the EU-15 fell by 2 pp. 
Gas was the second largest fuel both for the EU-15 and the 
EU-12 and amounted respectively to 23.4% and 20.7% of  final 
energy consumption.  In both cases,  this  share  slightly 
decreased between 2007 and 2008, by close to 0.2 pp. 
Electricity represented  a bigger share of the final energy 
consumption in 2008 in the EU-15 (21.6%) than in the EU-12 
(17.6%),  remaining  stable  for  the  EU-15  and  increasing 
by 0.3 pp for the EU-12 compared to 2007. 
EU-15, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL AND PRODUCT (in %) (2008) 
Gas  23.4% 
Solid fuels  3. 5 % 
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Total= 999.53 Mtoe  Source:Eurostot 
FIGURE 5/2 
EU-12, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL AND PRODUCT (in%) (2008) 
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(8) EU-15 denotes those EU Member States that joined the Union before 2004; EU-12 refers to those countries that  joined the EU 
in the last two waves of  accessions (2004 and 2007). 
Source: Eurostat 2.1.4.2.  Final energy consumption by  sector 
Transport  remained the biggest final energy consumer in 
2008 followed by industry and households. Compared to 
2007,  the  shares  of transport  and  industry  decreased 
respectively by 0.6 and 0.7  pp. Since 1990, annual energy 
consumption in the transport sector fell for the first time 
FIGURE 6/1 
in  2008,  and averaged  1.6% per annum during the last 
eighteen years. In contrast, the shares of households and 
services rose  In  2008  (by  1 pp and 0.6  pp, respectively}. 
Households  amounted  to one  quarter of final  energy 
consumption (25.4%) while services represented 13.1 %. 
EU-27, TOTAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1995-2008) 
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Source: Eurostat 
FIGURE 6/2 
EU-27, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SECTOR (in%) (2008) 
Tran~port  32% 
Industry  27.2% 
Total = 1 168.63 Mtoe 
In 2008. the breakdown of  final energy consumption by sector 
showed differences between the EU-15 and the EU-12. For the 
EU-15, transport was the biggest consumer (33 %), followed by 
industry (26.8%)  and households  (24.9%).  For  the EU-12, 
industry was still the biggest consumer (29.8%)  followed by 
households (28.1 %) and transport (26.3 %). The proportion of 
the  service  sector  in  final  energy  consumption  was 
comparable between the EU-15 (13.3%} and the EU-12 (12.4%). 
25.4 .,_  Households 
2.2 q  Agriculture 
13.1  °~  Services, etc. 
Source: Eurostor 
The share of transport rose by 3 pp in the EU-12 final energy 
consumption between 2006 and 2008 (from 23.3% to 26.3 %) 
while for the EU-15 it remained practically stable. The share of 
households dimfnished in the case of the EU-12  by 1.3 pp 
while for the EU-15 only minor changes could be observed 
during  this  three  year  period.  These  data  suggest  a 
convergence between the structure of  economic  actors' final 
energy consumption in EU-15 and EU-12 countries. 2.1.5.  Energy intensity 
Energy intensity is a measure of how much energy is used to 
produce a unit of  economic output. It  can be measured as the 
ratio of  gross inland energy consumption and gross domestic 
product. The following  charts show the evolution of this 
indicator between 2000 and 2008. Since 2003  the energy 
FIGURE 7 
intensity improved significantly and in 2008 the EU economy 
needed  11%  less  energy  for producing  a unit of  gross 
domestic  product (GOP)  than in 2003. This development 
might  have been in relation with increasing energy prices that 
incentivised all economic actors to consume less energy. 
EU-27, ENERGY INTENSITY (in toe/EUR million) (2000-2008) 
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Another measure is final energy intensity. In 2008, EU-27 final 
energy intensity kept improving, registering a decrease  in 
energy needs for producing  a  unit of GOP  for the fifth 
consecutive year. Overall, final energy intensity in 2008 was 
104.4 toe/M€ · in 2008 while it was 105.7 toe/M€in 2007 and 
113.9 toe/M€  in 2006. However, the annual decrease registered 
in 2008 was the smallest in the 2003-2008 period. 
FIGURE 8 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Source: Eurostat 
With the exception of the least energy-intensive sector, the 
services sector, for which the final energy intensity indicator 
deteriorated from 18.6 to 19.2 toe/M€between 2007  and 
2008, progress was made in all remaining sectors. Industry, 
the main driver of progress in energy intensity in the past, 
further improved its final energy Intensity by approximately 
4% (- 5 toe/M€). Transport also contributed to falling energy 
intensity by 2.2% (- 0.8  toe/M~). 
EU-27, FINAL ENERGY INTENSITY (in toe/EUR million) (1995-2008) 
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(9) In order  to  eliminate the Impact of  inflation from data of  different years, euro values in the denominator of  energy Intensity numbers 
always refer to euros deflated  to  year 2000. 
Source: Eurostat 2.1.6.  Uses of  energy sources 
In 2008, natural gas consumption in the  EU-27 was mainly split 
between power generation (31 .9%),  households  (26.5 %), 
industry (20%)  and services  (12.3%).  Compared  to  2007, 
FIGURE 9 
the share of industry decreased by 1 pp while the share of 
power generation rose  by 0.9 pp. The share of households 
increased by 0.5 pp compared to 2007. 
EU-27, USE OF NATURAL GAS BY SECTOR (in %) (2008) 
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The  situation is  quite different for oil and  solid fuels, 
the transport sector being the main user of  oil (61.3% in 2008). 
Both industry and household sector (together with services) 
represented smaller share in the use of  petroleum products 
(24.1 %and 14.6o/o, respectively). 
FIGURE 10 
EU ~27 , USE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY SECTOR (in %) (2008) 
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Energy available for final consumption = 582 Mtoe  Source:Eurosror By  far the main use of solid fuels is power generation  (14.1 %, 4.7% and 3.3%, respectively). Households and district 
(71.3% in 2008). Industry, blast furnace plants and coke oven  heating together represented less than a 5% share, pointing 
plants represented smaller shares in use of  solid fuels in 2008  to a diminishing importance of  solid fuels in heating. 
FIGURE 11 
EU-27, USE OF SOLID FUELS BY SECTOR (in%) (2008) 
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Electricity consumption is split between three main sectors.  declined  by 0.4 pp between 2007  and  2008  that of 
In 2008, Industry was the biggest consumer of  electricity with  households rose by the same amount. A slight decrease in 
a 40% share of  overall consumption, followed by households  the share of  services (0.5 pp) could also be observed. 
(28.6%)  and services (26.3 %). While  the share of Industry 
FIGURE 12 
EU-27, FINAL USE OF ELECTRICITY BY SECTOR (in%) (2008) 
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Final electricity consumption = 245.5 Mtoe  Source:Eurostat R ES are mainly used by households, in power generation and 
by industry. In 2008, households amounted to 22.3% of  EU-27 
use of  renewables, decreasing by 0.9 pp from 2007. The share 
of power generation (26.4 %) was also down by 0.8 pp while 
tha{ of industry (1 3.5 %) rose slightly by 0.3 pp between 2007 
and 2008. The use of RES in transport showed a dynamic 
increase between 2006 and 2008 (its share increasing from 
FIGURE 13 
4.1 %in 2006 to 5.6% in 2007 and 6.7% in 2008). The share of 
district  heating  represented  2.7%  of the  gross  inland 
consumption of  RES in 2008, up by 0.3 pp compared to 2007, 
which  equals the value  measured  in 2006.  Inter-product 
transfers accounted for 25.8% of  gross inland consumption of 
RES in 2008, which was close to the respective value of the 
preceding year. 
EU-27, USE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES BY SECTOR (in%) (2008) 
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EU-27 - RES CONSUMPTION 
Gross inland consumption of renewable energy sources (RES) continued to grow in 2008 (by 5.6% since 2007), 
reaching 151  Mtoe. RES are the fifth energy source in the EU energy mix with a share of  8.4% in 2008, up by 0.6 pp 
from 2007. 
Biomassl1 01  is by far the largest RES consumed in EU-27 and is consumed in power generation, heat and transport. 
In 2008, consumption of biomass grew by 4.7 Mtoe/ 4.8% to reach  105.2 Mtoe. Biomass represented 69.7% of 
the consumption of  RES in the EU, remaining stable compared to the previous year. 
Hydro power remained the second largest RES consumed in the EU with a consumption of  28.1  Mtoe in 2008, which 
represents 1.5 Mtoe more than in 2007 (+ 5.6%). Its share in the RES consumption reached 18.6% in 2008, which is 
comparable to the 2007 level. The share of geothermal energy in RES consumption fell to 3.8 %, down by 0.2 pp 
in 2008, as a result of a slight increase (0.5 %) in consumption which was relatively low compared to the overall 
RES consumption growth. 
Consumption of  wind energy increased to 10.2 Mtoe in 2008, up by 1.2 Mtoe, growing by 13.3% compared to 2007. 
The share of wind in RES consumption increased by 0.4 pp, reaching 6.7 %. It remained the third biggest RES 
consumed in the EU. Solar energy experienced the highest annual growth rate (36.7%) among renewable energy 
sources, although its share rose only to 1.1  o/o in 2008. 
FIGURE 14 
EU-27, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES: GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE (in%) (2008) 
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2.2.1.  EU indigenous energy production 
EU  energy production declined in  2008,  continuing the  In 2007. Monthly aggregated data suggest that in 2009 the 
downward trend which began in 2003. In 2008, indigenous  decrease  of energy  production  accelerated  (-4.7 %)  as 
production fell by 0.7 %, to 853 Mtoe, compared to 859 Mtoe  the economic crisis impacted on energy demand. 
FIGURE 15 
EU-27, INDIGENOUS ENERGY PRODUCTION (in Mtoe) (1995-2008) 
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Except for the production of  RES which increased by 5.5 %, 
the production of  all other energy sources either remained 
stable or declined between 2007 and 2008. The biggest drop 
occurred in oil production (-7.7 Mtoe/ -6.3 %) and production 
of solid fuels (-7.4 Mtoe/ -4%). After declining continuously 
between 2005 and 2007, gas and nuclear energy production 
remained  relatively  stable  in  2008,  reaching  annual 
produdion levels of 1 68.1 Mtoe and 2 41.8 Mtoe, respectively. 
The slight upturn in gas production (of 0.5 %)  In  2008 was 
mainly  due  to  a  10 o/o  increase  in  production  in  the 
Netherlands. Besides the Netherlands'''', Denmark was  the 
only EU country that experienced an  increase in indigenous 
gas production (of 9 %)  in 2008 compared to the previous 
year. Other EU countries continued to produce less gas. 
Since  2001  when  the last  EU-27  production  peak  was 
registered, indigenous production of gas has shrunk by more 
than 19o/o.ln 2008, the German gas indigenous production fell 
by 14%, while Italy, the UK and Romania experienced less 
decrease in their production (4.6%, 3.4% and 2.6%, respectively). 
Source: Eurostot 
Nuclear and gas  remained the two largest energy sources 
produced in  the EU-27 with an individual share of  28.4 o/o and 
19.7 %,  respectively. These shares are 0.3 pp higher than in 
2007. As a consequence of declining production, shares of 
solid fuels and oil experienced a 0.9 pp and 0.8 pp decrease 
between 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
Conversely, renewable energy sources amounted to 17.4% of 
EU  indigenous energy production in 2008,  compared  to 
16.2% in 2007. In  2008, the gap between the share of  EU-27 
RES production and that of oil continued to widen (by 4%) 
and  the share of renewables production became more 
comparable to that of gas, implying a decreasing importance 
of fossil fuels. 
(11) In rhe Netherlands and Denmark, production data in the last decade did  nor show the decreasing rrend rhar  choracrer/ses the  production 
of  most of  the EU countries orlginoting from the depletion of  gos fields. FIGURE 16 
EU-27, PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION AND RECOVERED PRODUCTS (in Mtoe) (2008) 
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2.2.2.  EU electricity generation 
Total electricity generation in 2008 was 3374 TWh, which was  in both 2007 and 2008 was lower than in preceding years. 
0.2% higher than 2007 total generation, and represented a  According to monthly aggregated data, electricity generation 
new record high. It confirmed the continued upward trend of  dropped by 5 o/o  in 2009 compared to the previous year, 
electricity generation. However, the annual increase of 0.2%  reflecting the impact of the deep economic crisis. 
FIGURE 17 
EU-27, ELECTRICITY GENERATION (in TWh) (1995-2008) 
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Source: Eurostot While in 2007 coal was  the main energy source of power 
generation  in  the  EU-27,  in  2008 it was  nuclear energy, 
recording an  unchanged 27.8% share  against a declining 
share of coal  (26.7%  in 2008 vs.  28.6 o/o  in  2007).  Power 
generation from coal fell by 6.3% compared to 2007 while 
that of nuclear energy remained stable (+0.2 %). This slight 
upturn in power generation from nuclear marked the end in 
a four year decline in production ~"'~ . On the other hand. power 
production from coal continued to decline since it reached 
its peak in 2003. 
FIGURE 18 
Electricity generation from  gas  and  from RES  increased 
significanlly in 2008, by  5.2 o/o or about 40 TWh for gas and by 
8.1 o/o or 42 TWh for RES respectively. The trend towards more 
gas and RES for power generation was confirmed. In 2008, gas 
amounted to 24% of the electricity produced, up by 1.4 pp 
with respect to 2007, while RES increased its share by 1.2 pp 
and amounted to 16.8 % of electricity produced. In the last 
five years, the share of  gas in electricity generation has risen 
by 5.4% while thar of  renewable energy sources increased 
by 3.9%,  which confirms the increasing importance of gas 
in power production. 
EU-27, ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY FUEL (in%) (2008) 
Other  17% 
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In 2008, only 3.1 % of electricity was generated from  oil, 
compared to 3.3 o/o  in 2007. Oil still remains a marginal  and 
declining source used for power generation. Oil continued to 
play a role  in  power production mainly in geographically 
isolated areas (e.g.: Islands) which were not connected to 
other power grids. 
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Source: Eurostot 
53.8% of EU  electricity was  generated from  fossil  fuels 
and 46.2 o/o  from  low-carbon energy sources in 2008. 
In comparison, Fossil fuels contributed 55.6% to the power 
generated in 2007 while low-carbon energy contributed 
44.4% to the total power generation. 
(12) The decline in E U nuclear power production was also Influenced by  shutting down reactors in Bulgaria and Lithuania, 
and after these reactors were out  of  production and  others continued to operate, there were no reasons for  further decline. FIGURE 21 
EU-27, RENEW ABlES: PRODUCTION OF BIOFUElS (in Mtoe and%) (2008) 
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FIGURE 22 
EU-27, ElECTRICITY FROM RENEWABlE ENERGY SOURCES (in GWh) (1990-2008) 
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Source: Eurostot Power production from solar energy experienced the most dynamic growth between 2007 and 2008; reaching 
7.4TWh in 2008, which was almost twice the previous year's value. Nevertheless, solar  energy's portion was still less 
than 1% in overall RES-based power production. In 2008, electricity generated from wind rose by 13% (14 TWh) 
compared to 2007 and amounted to 118.7 TWh. As for biomass, electricity generation grew by 7% (7 TWh) over 
the same period and amounted to 107.9 TWh. Electricity production from hydro power rose by more than 5% 
and reached nearly 327 TWh. 
FIGURE 23 
EU-27, ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN GROSS ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION 
(in %} (2008} 
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After a temporary decrease in 2007, EU-27 net energy imports 
increased again and reached a historical high of 1014 Mtoe in 
2008. Compared to 2007,  the increase was 26 Mtoe or 2.6% 
in 2008. This increase in net imports was accompanied by 
decreasing energy consumption and indigenous production. 
FIGURE 24 
According to monthly aggregated data in 2009, net energy 
imports fell again by approximately 5.7 %,  in line with the 
contraction of economic performance In  the economies 
of the EU-27. 
EU-27, NET IMPORTS OF ENERGY (in Mtoe) (1990-2008) 
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Imports increased for both oil and gas between 2007 and 
2008  (1.7% and 5.4%,  respectively).  Both oil and gas  net 
imports set a record high value in 2008 (Oil: 598.3 Mtoe; gas: 
274.5 Mtoe). At the same time, imports of  solid fuels increased 
only by  0.8% since  2007,  reaching  137.5  Mtoe. In 2009, 
the changes in imports calculated from the aggregation of 
monthly data show significant drops in the imports of hard 
coal (-16%).  crude oil  (-7%)  and a minor decrease in the 
FIGURE 25 
Source: Eurostar 
imports of  natural gas (-1.5%), resulting in an  overall 5.7% 
drop in energy product imports, mainly due to large falls in 
industrial demand due to the economic crisis. 
Crude oil still  represented  the biggest imported energy 
source In  2008,  corresponding to 59% of EU-27  Imports. 
The share of  gas represented 27% of  total net imports in 2008, 
which is only slightly less (-0.4 pp) than in 2007. 
EU-27, NET IMPORTS OF ENERGY BY ENERGY SOURCE (in%) (2008) 
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Total = 1 014.95 Mtoe  Source: Eurostat In 2008, the main external suppliers of  oil to the EU were OPEC 
countries (36 %), Russia (32 %), Norway (15 %) and Kazakhstan 
(5%). In consequence of the decreasing oil supply coming 
from Russia (-7 Mtoe/-3.6%) compared to 2007, the country's 
share of EU imports fell by 1.7 pp in 2008. Conversely,  the 
other main suppliers increased market shares. such as the 
OPEC which rose by 0.5 pp and that of  both Norwayn'  and 
Kazakhstan which edged up slightly by 0.2 pp. As a result. 
external  sources  of oil supply to  the EU  became more 
diversified in 2008. The gap between the two main suppliers, 
OPEC and Russia, widened from 1.7 to  4 pp between 2007 and 
2008.  In  2009.  according  to monthly aggregated  data, 
rhe import share of Russia increased again while  that of 
OPEC countries decreased. 
The three main suppliers of  gas to the EU in  2008 were Russia 
(39.3%),  Norway  (30.1 %)  and  Algeria  (15.4 %).  Norway 
FIGURE 26/1 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL (in Mt, %) (2008) 
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FIGURE 26/2 
strengthened its position as a major gas supplier to the EU 
(with a share in total EU-27 imports up by 0.9 pp from 2007). 
Although both Russia and Algeria exported more natural gas 
to the EU  in 2008 (up by 5.2% and 2.8 %,  respectively). this 
volume increase was below the average growth of overall 
EU-27 imports (7% compared to 2007) and thus the share of 
both countries diminished (by 0.7 pp  and 0.6 pp, respectively). 
Sources of gas became slightly less concentrated in 2008. 
In 2009, this trend seemed to continue; the import share of 
Russia fell by more than 3 pp. This might have been related to 
the economic crisis, the diminishing competitiveness of  long 
term gas contract prices (LTC) compared to LNG and the gas 
crisis in January 2009. Import share of  Algeria fell by nearly 
1 pp while that of Norway was up by nearly 2 pps. Nigeria's 
share in total EU imports was down by more than 1 pp, while 
Qatar doubled its share by  providing LNG to the EU. 
OPEC 
countrie5 
Source: Euro5tar 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF NATURAL GAS (in TJ, %) (2008) 
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( 14) Although Norway'5 crude oil production continued to decline  In 2008, 5ee chapter 3.1.5. The coal market is more diversified  than the oil and gas 
markets. Coal imports in 2008 came mainly from six countries: 
Russia (27 .1 %), South Africa (17.5%), the United States (14.6%), 
Colombia (12.7%), Australia (12.3%), and Indonesia (7.6%). 
Compared to 2007, all suppliers except for South Africa and 
Indonesia increased their exports to the EU. Russia increased 
its share by more than 1 pp, while South Africa's share fell by 
3.8 pp compared to 2007,  primarily  due to  a decrease in 
exports to the EU by almost one R fth si  nee 2007. On the other 
FIGURE 27 
hand, the United  States significantly increased coal exports 
to the EU-27  in 2008 (+48 %), thereby gaining almost 5 pp 
in market share. Both Australia and Colombia shares in EU-27 
overall Imports fell (by 1.4 pp and 0.7 pp respectively). 
Preliminary 2009 data show that the import  structure became 
more concentrated with Russia and Colombia having further 
Increased  market shares  and South Africa  continuing to 
represent a smaller proportion of EU-27 overall coal importS. 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF HARD COAL (in 1 000  t, o/o) (2008) 
Indonesia  16 141 (7.6 %) 
United States  30 988  ( 14.6 %) 
Colombia 26 866 (12.7 %) 
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Total = 218 230 000 t 
In 2008, Russia remained a significant source of  imports for oil, 
gas and coal into the E U while Norway played a greater role in 
EU  imports of gas  and  oil  than  in  the  previous  year. 
The Middle East was a major supplier of oil and North Africa 
was an important source of imports for gas and oil. For hard 
coal, Australia,  Colombia and  South Africa  still  played an 
important role among major suppliers to the EU. 
In power generation steam coal is of particular importance. 
In 2009 86% of the EU gross inland consumption of  steam 
coal was  used  for electricity generation. This  equals 208 
million tonnes (compared to 235 Mt in 2008). In 2009 the EU 
imported 148 Mt of  steam coal (160 Mt in 2008}. 35% of  steam 
coal  Import  originates from Russia  which is  the largest 
supplier. Colombia (21  %), South Africa  (18%), Indonesia (9%) 
and the USA (7 %) also have significant shares In steam coal 
supply to the EU. 
17 362 (8.2 %)  Other 
Russia 
Source: Eurostat 
2.2.4.  EU import  dependency 
In 2008, EU-27 overall energy import dependency"'' climbed 
to a record  high value (54.8 %)  after a transitory decrease 
recorded in 2007. This was 1.7 pp higher than in the previous 
year. The increasing import dependency resulted from rising 
dependence on all kinds of  fossil fuels,  without exceptions. 
Import dependence on oil rose to 84.3%, up by 1.8 pp from 
its value of  2007. A new record high dependency rate was also 
set in the  Import of  natural gas (62.3  %). 
In  2008,  56% of EU-27  needs  in  energy were  sat isfied 
domestically. According to 2009 preliminary data, with the 
exception of  natural gas, import dependency remained stable 
during a year that can be characterised by large decreases 
in energy demand linked to the economic crisis.  However, 
gas import dependency again reached a new record high 
value of 64%. 
(7 5)  The import  dependency is  measured as the ratio of  net  imports to gross inland  consumption plus bunkers. FIGURE 28 
EU-27, IMPORT DEPENDENCY (in o/o)  (1995-2008) 
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2.3.  EU ENERGY SECTOR'S  CLIMATE 
PERFORMANCE 
2.3.1.  GHG emissions 
In 2008, EU-27 total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions without 
LULUCF'"'' amounted to 4940 Mt C0
2-equivalent. In 2008, 
these decreased for the seventh consecutive year, falling by 
2% or 99 Mt C02-equivalents compared to 2007. C02 remains 
the main greenhouse gas,  with a  83.7 o/o  share  of GHG 
emissions, followed by  methane (CH4), with a 7.8%  share and 
nitrous oxide (N20), with  a share of  6.9%. 
In the last quarter of  2008 the beginning of  the economic 
crisis exerted a lowering impact on global GHG emissions. It is 
also worth mentioning that a shih in power generation mix 
helped to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases. In 2008 
electricity generation from gas and renewable energy sources 
increased compared to 2007, while at the same time coal-
based power generation decreased, improving the carbon 
intensity of overall energy production. These developments 
all helped in attaining more favourable emission objectives. 
EU  environmental  and climate  policies  also  exerted  a 
downward pressure on  GHG emissions. In December  2008 the 
so-called energy and climate package were adopted by the 
Council of  the European Union and the European Parliament. 
Through several common and coordinated  policy measures 
this package aims at attaining significant savings in GHG 
emissions. The most Important areas  cover the Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS), the Renewables Directive, the transport 
sector (fuel quality legislation) and legislations promoting 
reduction in energy demand, such as the energy performance 
of the buildings, eco-design requirements or promotion of 
co-generation {combined heat and power). 
Source: Eurostal 
In 2008, EU-27 energy-related GHG emissions (i.e. combustion 
and  fugitive emissions)  represented  79.1%  of total  GHG 
emissions and amounted to 3907 Mt C0
2  equivalents which 
was  slightly  less  than  in 2007  (79.2% and  3978  Mt C0
2 
equivalents). 
Due to an almost 5% drop in energy-related GHG emissions, 
the share of  energy industries in GHG emissions decreased by 
1 pp in 2008 compared  to the previous year. The GHG 
emissions of manufacturing and construction industries were 
down by 3.3%, which  led to a 0.5 pp drop in the industry's 
share in GHG emissions. As transport-related GHG emissions 
were also down by 1.8% compared to 2007,  the sector 
preserved its 19.5% share of total GHG emissions. having 
decreased by 2% year-on year. 
By contrast, due to an annual increase of  7.5 o/o in residential 
sector related GHG emissions, the share of households in total 
GHG grew by 0.8 pp, having reached 9.3% in 2008. Due to  an 
increase of more than 7 o/o  in services-related emissions, 
the share of this sector also rose by 0.3 pp to 3.6% In 2008. 
The Increase in importance of households and services in 
GHG emissions was mainly due to colder weather conditions. 
( 16) The impact of  land use, land  use changes and  forestry (LULUCF) on the GHG inventories is excluded. FlGURE 29 
EU-27, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (in%) (2008) 
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The transport sector experienced the most significant decline  all  other sectors  continued  their  generally  decreasing 
in emissions in 2008 (from 1990 to 2007 emissions increased  emission trend. The total GHG emissions of  energy industries 
almost  permanently;  only  minor  decreases  could  be  reached their lowest levels since 2001. 
observed). With the exception of households and services, 
FIGURE 30 
EU-27, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (GHG) BY SECTOR (1990-2008) 1990=100 
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According to estimations of the European  Environmental 
Agency (EEA). GHG emissions fell sharply in the EU-27 in 2009 
compared w 2008, with expectations of  reductions in  all GI-IG 
emission of  6.9  o/ol". The total amount of  verified emissions in 
2009 from EU  ETS installations in the EU-27 was 1.85 billion 
tonnes of  C0
2
, almost 11.6% lower than in 2008. The drop in 
emissions can be amibuted to various interdependent factors 
such as reduced economic activity as a result of the recession, 
lower levels of gas  prices throughout 2009,  and a sharp 
reduction in the consumption of  coal products. 
(17) With a +-0.6%  estimation error. 
Source: European Environmental  Agency 
EEA data also show the countries having the highest annual 
GI-IG emissions, and the relation of  the latest emission data to 
that of the Kyoto Protocol target. In 2008 Germany's GHG 
emission was  958.1 Mt C0
2  equivalents, which was  slightly 
more than in 2007 (+0.1 %), but it was less than the 2012 target 
value (973.6 Mt C0
2  equivalents). The UK's  GHG  emission 
amounted to 628.2 Mt  C02 equivalents, having decreased by 
1.8% compared to 2007 and it was also lower than the target 
of 679.3 Mt C0
2 equivalents. The third largest GHG emitter 
Member State of  the EU was Italy, with an annual emission of 541.5  Mt C02  equivalents. which  was  2o/o  less  than  the 
respective value of 2007, but it still exceeded the target for 
2012 (483.3 Mt C02 equivalents). France managed to show a 
slight decrease (0.6 %) in its GHG emission in 2008. amounting 
to 527 Mr C02 equivalents, which was also below its Kyoto 
target (563.9 Mt C0 2 equivalents). 
Poland's 2008 GHG emission was well  below its 2012 target 
(529.6 Mt C02 equivalents), similarly to the majority of the 
transition economies (the majority of the new Member 
States). The reason for this good emission performance lies 
behind the rapid change in the economic structure in the 
1990s that can be characterised by the fall in production of 
heavy industry activities. This helped in radically reducing 
GHG emissions since the base year. 
In contrast,  Spain's 2008 annual GHG  emission, In spite of 
decreasing by 7.5% compared to  2007, was st ill higher  than its 
2012 target (333.2 Mt C01 equivalents). 
Taking a closer look  at the change In GHG emissions between 
the Kyoto  base  year''  and  2008,  the biggest decrease 
occurred in Poland (29.8 %) among those s.ix countries that 
FIGURE 31 
contributed  the most to the GHG  emissions in  the  EU. 
Remarkable  decreases  in  GHG  emissions  could  also  be 
observed in Germany (22.3 %),  the UK  (19.1  %)  and France 
(6.5 %). In contrast  in Italy and Spain the 2008 emission data 
were higher than those of  the base year (by 4.8% and 40%, 
respectively). 
2.3.2.  C0
2 emissions and Intensity 
In 2008, energy-related C02 emissions amounted to 3787 Mt 
and accounted for 92.5% of total C02 emissions. Between 
2007 and 2008, they decreased by 1.8% or 70 Mt.ln the EU-27, 
both households and services increased their levels of C0
2 
emissions related to  energy by 7.5% and 8.2% respectively. 
C02  intensity,  measured  as  a ton of C02  per ton of oil 
equivalent, fell  slightly in 2008, reaching 2.44  r C02 I  roe 
(compared to 2.48 t C0
2 I toe measured in 2007). This was the 
first year since 2004 that any perceivable change occurred In 
this intensity measure. C0
2 emissions per capita fell by 2.5% to 
a value of  8815 kg per capita in 2008 This was the lowest level 
since 1990. 
EU-27, C02 1NTENSJTY (in kg CO/ toe) AND C02 PER CAPITA (in kg CO/ cap) (1990-2008) 
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The split in the EU-27 C02 emissions in 2008 between the six 
largest C02  emitters did not change since 2007: Germany 
(833 Mt), the United Kingdom (533 Mt), Italy (468 Mt), France 
(391 Mt). Spain (338 Mt) and Poland (324 Mt). However, all of 
these Member States reduced their total emissions compared 
to 2007. The Member States that reduced their C02 emissions 
the most compared to 2007 were: Portugal (-9.9%), Spain 
(-8.2 %), Slovenia (-6.9%), Romania (-6.5 o/o} and Denmark (-6  %). 
There were five Member States where C01  emissions either 
grew or remained stable. 
In terms of  C01 intensit y, which gives an indication of  the C02 
content of the fuel  mix, the six Member States with the 
Source: European Environment Agency 
highest t CO/toe levels in 2008 were: Malta (5.91),  Greece 
(3.83), Cyprus (3.44), Poland (3.30), Ireland (3.19) and Estonia 
(3.12); the same countries as in 2007. The Member States that 
showed the largest drop in C0
2  intensity (measured as  the 
difference between the 2007 and 2008 t CO/toe values) were: 
Greece and Estonia (-0.20) and Romania (-0.17). In contrast. 
C02  intensity increased significantly  in  Malta  (0.17),  the 
Netherlands (0.08) and Portugal (0.04). 
Overall,  18 Member States were above the EU-27  average 
In 2008, similarly to  the previous year. 
( 7  8) In most cases Kyoto base  year's GHG emission is close ro that  of  the annual data of  7  990 , but  in the 27 MemberS  totes of  the EU diff erent  base  years  could be agreed 
for  different GHG  components. 3.1.  MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OIL 
SECTOR OF THE EU 
3.1.1.  The international environment and the crude 
oil price evolution 
After the financial crisis and the ensuing deep economic 
contraction In 2008, the oil industry was confronted in 2009 
and  the  beginning  of  2010  with a  very  unstable  world 
environment. Instability was both reflected in  the slight 
recovery  that  followed  the  g lobal  recession  and 
in  the  Increasing growth disparities  between OECD 
and non-OECD zones. 
Indeed, the 1.1 %drop in the world's GDP in 2009 concealed 
the development of  significant disparities in regional growth 
trends. China and India respectively achieved 8.5% and 5.4% 
growth, whereas the US (-2.4 %) and the euro area (-4.0%) fell 
into recession. On the whole, world oil demand fell  by 
1.3 million barrels per day (b/d) or nearly 2% in 2009, a second 
year  of consecutive  decline.  OECD  demand  fell  by 
2.2 million b/d (or nearly 5.0%), a fourth consecutive annual 
decline whereas demand increased in some parts outside the 
OECD, notably in China, Saudi Arabia and India. 
After its recovery against the euro during the second half of 
2008, the dollar faced a new period of depreciation in the 
course of 2009,  falling from €0.74  in December  2008  to 
€0.68 in December 2009. It subsequently recovered to reach 
€0.82 In June 2010. Over the entire year of 2009,  the dollar 
reached $0.72, compared to $0.68 in 2008. Crude oil prices 
surged In the first half  of  2008 peaking above $140 per barrel 
(bbl) In early July and thereafter fell sharply reaching a low 
of around  $35/bbl in  December. Since then,  oil  prices 
have recovered considerably. 
Oil price behaviour in 2009 can be divided into two distinct 
phases. The first was the recovery phase which saw the Dated 
Brent price. the European benchmark crude, rising from a very 
low base of  $40.35 on average in December 2008 to $74.28 in 
December 2009, an increase of 84% in US dollars or 69% 
when expressed in euros. The second was the stabilisation 
phase which saw the oil price oscillating within a relatively 
narrow price band mostly between $60 and $70 between the 
months of July and September and then between $70 and 
$80 between the months of  October and December. For the 
whole year 2009. the Dated Brent price averaged $61.7 against 
$97.3 in 2008, a decline of 37%, the largest one, In percentage 
terms, since 1986. 
In  fact, 2009 represents a remarkable year In at least two 
1 espects. First, it experienced the sharpest increase in spot oil 
prices in decades. Second, from July to December, it  exhibited 
a high degree of  relative stability despite a very uncertain and 
volatile global economic environment. The relative price 
stability continued during the first-half of2010 with the Brent 
price mostly fluctuating between $70 and $80/bbl. 
The improved economic outlook, including expectations of 
stronger future oil demand, was the main factor behind rising 
prices in 2009 and 2010. The oil supply, on the other hand, still 
indicated large flexibility and additional availability in the 
form of  both large inventories and spare capacity. Future price 
developments will depend on future production decisions as 
well  as  market  expectations  concerning  future supply 
constraints. Furthermore, crude oil futures prices still point 
to somewhat increasing prices in the short to medium term. FIGURE 32 
DATED BRENT (in EUR/ bbl and USD/bbl) AND EUR/USO EXCHANGE RATE (1/2008-9/2010) 
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3.1.2.  Drivers behind the  crude oil price 
developments 
The magnitude of variations in oil prices in 2008 and 2009, 
in tandem with other commodity prices,  has renewed the 
discussion about the impact of financial flows on oil market 
prices. However, studies undertaken so  far have failed to 
establish  links of causality between positions of financial 
investors, notably In futures markets, and the crude prices 
observed in the spot market. According to the International 
Energy Agency (lEA). market fundamentals appear to provide 
the best information on future price developments,  but a 
range of other factors,  including short-term money flows 
in and out of commodity markets and equity market shihs, 
can play a short-term role in influencing prices. 
A  better understanding of the price formation in rhe oil 
markets requires better and more transparent markets. With a 
view to achieving this goal, considering notably the price 
volatility on  the oil market and concerns about financial 
speculation, several actions have been taken at international 
level to enhance the functioning of  global oil markets. 
Under the global reform of financial markets, the G20 leaders 
agreed in September 2009 in Pittsburgh on the objective to 
improve over-the-counter (OTC)  derivates markets.  They 
notably agreed to improve the regulatory  oversight of  energy 
markets by implementing the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions' recommendations on commodity 
futures markets. 
The  aim  Is  to increase  overall  market functioning  and 
rransparency In the futures markets, giving regulators more 
power to detect and enforce manipulation cases; improving 
market supervision; publishing more extended and frequent 
physical  commodity market  data,  as  well  as  enhancing 
International co-operation among regulators. These measures 
( 19) COM(2009) 332 and  COM(2009) 563. 
(20) Regulation (EC) n"  7099/2008. 
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Sources:©  Platts (2010); ECB (2010) 
should further improve the link between fundamentals and 
futures prices. International coordination is important in this 
context to avoid any regulatory arbitrage. 
In  2009,  the  European  Commission  adopted  two 
Communications' ,,, to ensure the efficiency and soundness of 
derivatives  markets.  This  will  translate  into  legislative 
proposals  in  2010  in  line  with the  above-mentioned 
objectives agreed at the G20 meeting. 
Regarding  the  EU  physical  oil  markets,  the  European 
Commission has also taken various steps in recent years to 
improve  transparency,  e.g.  by establishing  the Market 
Observatory for Energy and adopting a new energy statistics 
Regulation'''1) as well as by participating in the global Joint Oil 
Data Initiative extended by this year's IEF to cover global data 
on natural gas. A more specific initiative concerns the recent 
revision of the strategic oil stock Directive (2009/119/EC). 
It introduces,  in  addition to strategic oil stock reporting, 
the monthly reporting of  commercial oil stocks. 
3.1 .3. The EU crude oil import bill 
In line with the evolution of  the Dated Brent price and  the 
OPEC basket price, the crude oil supply cost (CIF) of  the EU 
amounted to 60.5 $/bbl (weighted average for 2009) against 
94.4  $/bbl for 2008,  i.e.  a decline of 36% or 32% when 
expressed  in euros. For the first half of 2010,  an increase 
of 52% (in $ and in €) can  be noted in comparison  with 
the corresponding  period of 2009  (76.9  $/bbl  instead 
of  50.7 $/bbl). FIGURE 33 
DATED BRENT AND OPEC BASKET PRICES COMPARED TO CIF PRICES FOR EU-27 
(in USD/bbl) (1/2008-9/2010) 
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Total cost of  crude oil imported by the EU from third-party 
countries  reached $225.2  billion for the whole year  2009 
(versus $403.1  billion in 2008). On the basis of External trade 
Statistics (Eurostat's COMEXT database), EU crude oil imports 
represented, in value, some 13.5 o/o of total goods imported 
FIGURE 34 
from third-party countries in 2009 (versus 17.5  o/o  in  2008}. 
The following graph shows the monthly evolution (January 
2007-June 2010)  of the total EU crude oil import bill with 
a breakdown by main origins of  supply. 
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Source: European Commission 3.1.4.  Petroleum products price evolution 
3.1  .4.1.  Spot prices  and ex-tax prices 
As with the crude price evolution, the spot and ex-tax prices 
of oil  products recovered  throughout 2009, after falling 
significantly  at  the end  of 2008. Price  increases  mainly 
occurred during the first semester ar1d were followed in the 
second part of the year by less sustained  growth. In 2010, 
prices experienced a pretty steep upward trend ur~til mid-May 
and then registered  a stabilisation phase to date (end of 
September 2010). 
FIGURE 35 
Naphtha and jet fuel  spot prices,  which were significantly 
affected by the extremely low demand levels during the last 
quarter of 2008, registered the biggest increases in the first 
half of  2009. Spot prices and ex-tax prices evolved in parallel 
over  the January  2009  - September  2010  period,  the 
differential being the logistics and storage costs as well as 
distribution margins. 
Depending upon the product, EU level costs and distribution 
margins have mostly been fluctuating between €8 and € 14 
per 1000 Jitres since January 2009 which is in line with the 
annual averages of the two previous years (See Figure  36 
about the differential between spot prices and ex-tax prices). 
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DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN SPOT PRICES AND EX-TAX PRICES (in EUR/Iitre) {1/2008-9/2010) 
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In 2008, ex-tax prices for key petroleum products (EL1 ro-super 
95, diesel oil and heating gas oil) registered a less significant 
surge  and  subsequent  drop  than  for  crude  oil.  This 
differentiated evolution between crude and products, both 
expressed in euros, mitigated the extent of the impact on 
consumers of  the crude price increase and decrease. 
The evolution of  the euro!US dollar exchange rate also played 
an important role in the development of  petroleum products 
ex-tax prices in the euro area. Between January 2009 and 
September  2010,  there  were  several  appreciation  and 
depreciation  phases  of the euro  versus the  US  dollar. 
For instance, a 13% increase took place between April and 
November 2009 and was followed by a deprecation of 18% 
in the following period to June 2010. 
FIGURE 38 
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It is very clear from the graph below, in which the monthly 
evolution of prices (crude & products) is expressed, that this 
last depreciation of  the euro against the US dollar negatively 
Impacted the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in 
2010 in the EU. 
In addition, minor divergences are  noticeable in the same 
graph in the movement of  the Dated Brent price and the 
price for key petroleum products, both expressed  in euro. 
These divergences could be attributed to the fluctuations of 
seasonal demand for a particular product or to a temporary 
surplus or deficit on the international market. 
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Sources: e Platts (2010); European Commission (20 70) 3.1.4.2.  Consumer prices 
When comparing the following graph with the previous one, 
(Figure 37  with  Figure 38)  it  is  evident that consumer 
petroleum product prices (i.e. prices including taxes) have 
followed the same trend as ex-tax prices but with a smaller 
percentage increase or decrease due to the share of  taxation. 
Taxation (mainly VAT and excise duties) can have a cushion 
effect at consumer level'-11,  since in most member states, 
FIGURE39 
taxation, and in particular excise duties, remain fixed for at 
least one year. 
A comparison of  the two graphs also shows that the share of 
taxation has  increased  on average  at EU  level between 
January 2008  and  September 2010,  as  September 2010 
petroleum products ex-tax prices were below January 2008 
levels whereas consumer prices were slightly  above. 
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FIGURE 40 
EU27, WEIGHTED AVERAGE (in EUR) {1/2008-9/2010) 
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(21) At constanttaxarlon (indirect taxes + VAT) levels, the share of  taxorion in the consumer price is decreasing when the ex-tax produce price Is increasing 
and conversely, The taxation  share therefore has a cushion effect ar  consumer level, In the case of sharp upward or  downward trend s in ex-tax prices. 
This can be explained by  the fact thor the excise duty (and  possibly other Indirect taxes) is a fixed amount' which is Independent  from the evolution 
of  the ex-tax  prices. In turn, VAT, as an  ad valorem tax, applies on the total  of ex-tax  prices  plus excise duties (and  possibly other indirect taxes). 3.1.43.  Taxation 
At end-September 2010, excise duties on Euro-super 95 were 
higher than on diesel oll in all EU countries with the exception 
of  the UK where the excise duty rates according to volume 
were identical. 
FIGURE41 
Consequently, at the pump, the price of Euro-super 95 was 
higher than the price of  diesel oil in all Member States - with 
the exception of the UK - despite the fact that the ex-tax 
price was lower for Euro-super 95 than for diesel oil in all EU 
countries, with the exception of Malta. 
EU-27, CONSUMER PRICE OF EURO-SUPER 95 AND DIESEL OIL BY MEMBER STATE 
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FIGURE 42 
EU-27, EX-TAX PRICE OF EURO-SUPER 95 AND DIESEL OIL BY MEMBER STATE 
(in EUR/litre) (at end of September 201 O) 
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Excise duties and VAT rates differ widely from one EU country 
to another. The  variations in  excise  duties on the  main 
petroleum products at end-September 2010 were as follows: 
>  Diesel oil: from E274/1000 lltres in Lithuania to €670/1000 
litres in the UK (EU minimum threshold: €330/1000 litres); 
>  Heating gas oil: less taxed than motor  fuels in nearly all EU 
countries,  from  €10  /1000  litres  in  Luxembourg  to 
€415/1000  litres  in  Sweden  (EU  minimum  threshold: 
€21/1000 litres). 
>  Euro-super 95: from  €350/1000 litres in Romania and 
Bulgaria  to €670/1000  litres  in  Greece and  in  the UK 
(EU minimum threshold'  : €359/1000 litres); 
(22) The EU minimum threshold; for euro-super 95, diesel oil  and  heating oil  are defined  by Council Directive 2003/96/EC I  Energy  taxation directive). Member States with excise duties  below the EU  minimum 
threshold are taking advantage of a transitional period or an 
exemption. 
As  for VAT rates,  at the end of September 2010 they were 
typically ranging from  15% (Cyprus, Luxembourg) to 25% 
(Denmark, Hungary,  Sweden) although a limited  number 
MAP 1 
of reduced VAT rates  still exists in a few  Member States, 
mainly on heating gas oil. 
Total taxation share in the end-consumer price is illustrated 
by the  next  EU  map which  highlight s,  for motor fuels 
(Euro-super 95 and diesel oil), the situation in the different 
Member States at the end of  September 2010. 
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"' 3.1.5.  Evolution of  EU oil production and demand 
3.1.5.1.  Oil production developments at world level, 
in the EU and in Norway 
Global oil production fell In 2009 by 1.5 million bbl/d which is 
more than the decline In consumption of approximately 
1.3  million bbl/d that same year. This decline in production 
was  primarily  the  consequence  of  OPEC's  supply 
management during the year. OPEC made three successive 
production cuts in late 2008, in response to the sharp drop 
in oil prices; those cuts remained in effect throughout 2009. 
OPEC production fell by 2.3  million bbl/d in 2009 of which 
Saudi  Arabia made up nearly 1 million bbl!d. Production 
outside OPEC Increased, notably in the US by around half a 
million bbl!d (the  strongest increase  since  1970),  led by 
FIGURE43 
offshore production in the Gulf of  Mexico. Russia managed to 
increase further its oil production in 2009 compared to the 
previous year (+0.1 million bbl!d) and overtook Saudi Arabia 
with its  9.9  million  bbl  daily  production  (which  latter 
produced 9.8 million bbl per  day). 
In  the EU, on the basis of  Eurostat cumulated monthly data, 
crude oil production declined by about 6% in 2009 and is 
estimated at around 2 million b/d which represents about 
2.4% of world oil production. This decrease can mainly be 
attributed to the decline in North Sea production (the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands) which represents 
some 80 o/o of  total EU production. 
Norwegian  oil production, one of the main  EU  crude oil 
supply sources, fell by 3% in 2009, representing half of  the EU 
North Sea production fall (in percentage terms). 
EU-27 AND NORWAY AND NORTH SEA, CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (in Mb/day) (1990-2008) 
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3.1.5.2.  Evolution of  oil consumption in the EU 
It is widely considered that the  EU petroleum product market 
is a mature market which has more than likely already hit its 
peak. On top  of  long-lasting effects of  the global financial and 
economic crisis, EU regulations to tighten fuel specifications, 
reduce emissions from refineries and cars as well as to provide 
support for the development of  non-fossil fuel vehicles point 
towards a future of  diminishing demand for petroleum-based 
products. The demand for certain  products, In particular 
middle distillates such as jet fuel and diesel fuel, including 
marine gas oil, is however expected to continue to grow in 
the years to come. On the orher hand, gasoline demand in 
the EU is widely expected to fall further. 
Source: Eurostat (2010) 
Between 1990 and 2008,  the evolution of EU  demand in 
individual petroleum products reveals very different trends.: 
jet  fuel  &  kerosene  consumption  almost  doubled; 
consumption In diesel fuel registered a steady and sustained 
growth; demand for naphtha registered an initial increase and 
then a fall; demand for gasoline and heating oil fell quite 
sharply, while demand for residual fuel oil fell significantly. 
This decline in heating oil and residual fuel oil is partly due 
to the penetration of natural gas  in the households and 
industrial sectors. FIGURE44 
EU-27, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DEMAND EVOLUTION (in Mtoe) (1990-2008) 
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Source: Eurostot  {2010) 
FIGURE 45 
EU-27, PETROLEUM PRODUCT DEMAND MIX (in%) (1990-2008) 
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According to Eurostat cumulated  monthly  data, EU  gross 
inland oil consumption fell  by 4.5% in 2009 versus 2008 due 
to  the recession, reaching a level of  610 Mtoe or about 1 2.2 Mb/d, 
equivalent to  15 o/o  of world  oil consumption. The main 
petroleum products registered a decrease: 2% for gasoline, 
6.3 o/o for jet fuel &  kerosene, 4.7 o/o for  gas/diesel oil and 6.7 o/o 
for residual  fuel oil.  The share of these  main  petroleum 
products in 2009 EU  total inland deliveries was as follows: 
gasoline: 16.8 %, jet fuel & kerosene: 9.6 %,  gas/diesel oil: 
48% and residual fuel oil: 5.6%. 
2000  2005  2008 
Source: Eurostol {2010) 
Regarding road fuel demand in the EU, it can  be seen from 
the graph below that diesel oil has registered continuous 
growth between 1990 and 2009, whereas gasoline demand 
was flat between 1990 and 1999 and then it fell subsequently 
by about  25 o/o  between  1999 and  2009. This  is  probably 
related  to favourable taxation  conditions  of diesel  oil 
compared to that of  gasoline. FIGURE 46 
EU-27, EVOLUTION OF ROAD FUEL DEMAND (in Mt) (1990-2008) 
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As can be seen from the graph below, more road diesel fuel 
was consumed In 2009 than gasoline in all EU countries with 
the exceptions of  Greece and Cyprus. 
FIGURE47 
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EU-27, ROAD FUEL DEMAND BY MEMBER STATES (in Kt) (2009) 
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With regard to biofuels, biodiesel remained by far the main 
biofuel produced and marketed in the EU  in 2009 with an 
output of 9 million tonnes versus approximately 1.5 million 
tonnes of  biogasoline. The EU remained the leading biodlesel-
producing  region  worldwide,  representing  about 65% 
of  global output. 
The share of  biofuels in total final consumption of petrol and 
diesel oil for transportation purposes has been progressing 
in the EU over recent years to reach a level of around 3.7% 
in 2009. The Renewable Energy Directive·'  is creating a 
(23) COM 2009/28/EC. 
Sol.!rce: Etuostat (2010) 
strong  framework for the development of the biofuels 
Industry In the EU, with the landmark decision w Introduce 
a  lOo/o  binding  target In 2020  for renewable energy use 
In transport. In addition, biofuels could provide a genuine 
solution not  only to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
but  also to alleviate the Increasing EU diesel deficit. 3.1.6.  Refining sector developments in the EU1
24l 
The EU  nominal refining capacity (atmospheric distillation) 
currently represents 778 million tonnes (15.5 million barrels 
per day), equivalent to 18  o/o of  total global capacity. This EU 
capacity level has been fairly stable over the past decade. 
However, the refining capacity  in service in the EU is currently 
noticeably below the nominal capacity. 
MAP2 
In May 2010,  there were around 104 refineries operating in 
the EU  with at least one plant in all EU  countries with the 
exceptions of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Slovenia. 
NUMBER OF OPERATING REFINERIES AND REFINERY CAPACITY IN MILLION TONNES 
IN THE Elf  BY MEMBER STATE 
While EU nominal refining capacity is more than sufficient to 
cover total EU  gross consumption (inland consumption + 
bunkers)  which amounted to around 660 Mtoe in 2009, 
(i.e. 85 o/o of  the nominal refining capacity), the quantities of 
crude oil and other feed-stocks processed in the EU refineries 
amounted to 660 Mt in 2009 as against 709 Mt in 2008 '". 
Lower crude runs,  due to falling demand for petroleum 
products in 2009, in conjunction with stable nominal refining 
capacities, have pushed down EU  level refinery utilisation 
rates to below 80%, representing a continued Increase  in 
unused capacity. 
Refining margins also fell to very low (in some instances even 
negative) levels in 2009, both for simple and complex plants. 
Source: European Commission 
And while total refinery production capacity is well in excess 
of total gross consumption in the EU,  the situation is quite 
different at the level of  individual products. There have been 
growing production/consumption imbalances notably for 
gasoline and middle distillates (kerosene/jet fuels and gas/ 
diesel oil) in the EU in recent years. In particular, the rapid shift 
of motor fuel demand from gasoline to diesel oil (see Figure 45 
- evolution of  rood fuel demand) - the latter favoured by the 
taxation policy in place in most EU  countries as  already 
highlighted - has resulted in a growing production deficit 
for gas/diesel oil and surplus for gasoline at the EU level. 
These growing Imbalances have led the EU to become more 
and more dependent on trade in order to balance out supply 
124) It  is worth  noting here thor more information can be found an rhe  EU refinery secrar in rhe  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER ON REFINING 
AND THE SUPPLY  OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE EU published on 17 November 2010. 
(25) Eurastat cumulated monthly data. and demand. The gas/diesel oil deficit is covered to a large 
extent by  imports from Russia (35% of  gasoil/diesel imports In 
2008) while  a  large proportion of the excess  gasoline is 
exported to the USA (37% in 2008). When compared to EU 
gross  consumption  (inland  consumption  +  bunkers), 
the deficit of the EU  refinery production amounted to 7% 
FIGURE 48 
in 2008 for gas/diesel oil and to 20% for kerosenes and jet 
fuels. If the middle  distillates are considered as  a whole 
(gas/diesel oil + kerosenes & jet  fuels), then the deficit reached 
10% of  the EU gross consumption in 2008, causing an amount 
of net imports of  some 36 Mt. For the same year, gasoline 
production surpassed consumption by 43 Ml or 40%. 
EU-27, EVOLUTION OF NET IMPORTS/ EXPORTS IN KEY PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
(in 1000  t) (2000-2008) 
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Should EU  demand for middle distillates continue to grow 
(which is generally expected) and should the current structure 
of EU refining remain unchanged, the EU's  Import deficit in 
middle distillates will tend to extend further. This is not  only a 
problem for the  EU, in terms of  growing import dependency for 
such  product s,  but also  for the  EU  refining  industry  for 
disposing of  growing gasoline excess to other markets, which 
is not obvious given expected future developments in world 
demand for gasoline and diesel oil. In  the US, for instance, 
it is widely predicted that gasoline consumption would tend 
to  significantly decrease in the years to come. 
Overall crude quality evolution and, In particular,  falling North 
Sea crude production, might  also impact the EU refining industry 
in the  future. North Sea crude production (from Norway, UK and 
Denmark) fell from 6.4 to 4.3 million barrels per day between 
2000 and 2008. Over the same period, the supplies to Europe of 
heavier, sourer/more sulphurous crude oils,  from Russia  and 
Africa have been growing. The result has been an increase in the 
proportion of  heavy and sulphurous crude oils coming into EU 
refineries as well as a higher dependency on oil imports from 
third-party countries which represented 80% of EU  crude 
refinery intake in 2008 against 75% in 2000. 
The impact on the EU refining industry of lighter crude being 
replaced by heavier crude has varied according to region, with 
North-Western European (NWE) refineries being especially 
concerned. Conversely, In Central Europe, refineries are often 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Source: Eurostot 
located on the Druzhba pipeline, and the great majority of 
their intake is Urals crude. In the Mediterranean area, the 
larger proportion is Arabian Gulf, which is again heavier than 
Urals crude, with similar API but higher sulphur content. 
followed by Urals crude. 
Falling productions of  North Sea crude in an environment of 
growing demand for lighter distillates  represents a major 
concern for the NWE refining industry. Lighter crude oils such 
as North Sea crude produce a higher share of  more valuable, 
light products (such as  naphtha and  gasoline) that can be 
recovered with simple distillation, while heavier crude oils 
produce a greater share of lower-valued products (such as 
fuel  oil)  with  simple distillation  and  t herefore  require 
additional processing to produce higher value products. 
The quality of  crude oil thus dictates the level of  processing 
and re-processing to achieve the optimal mix of product 
output, with a trend towards heavier and more sulphurous 
crude oils leading to a more complex and costlier refining 
process, such as via the use of deep conversion and/or 
desulphurisation units, also leading to higher C02 emissions. 
Progressively, it is expected that NWE crude intake from the 
Urals,  Africa, the Caspian region and the Middle East will 
gradually come to represent growing proportions. This trend 
may become a key challenge for refiners mainly in the NWE 
region, pushing them towards investments for  the adaptation 
of  their plants In order  to renne the changing flow of  crude. FIGURE49 
EU-27, EVOLUTION OF REFINERY CRUDE INTAKE QUALITY (in API-weighted average) (1/2005-5/2010) 
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3.1.7.  EU crude oil and petroleum products imports 
and exports in 2009 
EU Member States import crude oil  (and feed-stocks) from a 
large number of  third-party countries.  Thirty-two  countries of 
origin were identified in 2009. Among them, Russia was the 
main supplier with a share of  33% of the crude imported by 
the EU, followed by Norway (15%) and Libya (9%). Three other 
countries: Iran, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, have a share 
between 5 and 7% and the remaining twenty-seven countries 
have a share below 5  o/o. 
FIGURE 50 
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Source: European Commission (2070) 
By geographical zone, the Former Soviet Union has a share 
of  42% of  the crude imported by EU Member States followed 
by Africa  (22%),  non-EU  Europe (18%), Middle East  (15%) 
and Americas (3 %). 
in 2009, OPEC countries represented 38% of the EU crude oil 
imports from third-party countries. 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL FROM THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES (in %) (2009) 
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EU  crude oil exports to third-party countries represented 
about 16% of  the EU crude oil production in 2009, with the 
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United States being the recipient of  62% of the total, nearly 
exclusively from the UK. FlGURE 51 
EU-27, EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL TO THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES (in%) (2009) 
UoitedStates  61,3% 
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As was the case for crude oil, Russia was the largest supplier 
of  petroleum products (mainly gas/diesel oil and residual fuel 
oil) to the EU with a 30 o/o share in 2009. The United States was 
the second largest supplier (mainly because of petroleum 
coke), with  a 13% share. 
FIGURE 52 
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In  2009,  OPEC  countries  represented  19o/o  of the total 
petroleum products imports from  third-party countries 
to the EU. 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES (in %) (2009) 
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Again, as  for crude oil, in 2009 the United States was  the 
largest  recipient of EU  petroleum products exports (22 %), 
mainly constituted of  gasoline accounting for 70 o/o of  the EU 
petroleum products exports to the US. 
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EU-27, EXPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES (in%) (2009) 
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3.2.  Market developments in the gas 
sector of the EU 
The 18 months covering 2009 and the first half of  2010 were 
an eventful period for the  European gas  sector. As  other 
industries,  the gas industry was operating in a context of 
difficult economic conditions. According to Eurostat,  in 01 
2009 the EU  economy registered  a 2.5% decrease  with 
respect to  04 2008, recording a fourth consecutive quarter of 
negative growth. That tendency persisted until mid 2009 
when the GOP of the EU started to recover slowly for the 
remainder of  the observed period. Gas suppliers, shippers and 
consumers found that their traditional relations were affected 
by the consequences of  the economic slowdown. 
The start and the end of  the observed period were marked by 
gas  disputes  which  took place  outside  of  the EU  but 
nevertheless affected EU consumers. Whereas the June 2010 
gas dispute between the Russian Federation and Belarus had 
an insignificant impact on consumers, the gas crisis between 
the Russian  Federation and Ukraine resulted in a complete 
halt of supply through the Ukrainian transit routes with an 
estimated economic impact of almost  € 1.6 billion for the 
EU1 ' '.  For a couple of weeks  in January  2009 a number 
of Member S tates from Eastern and Central Europe had no 
choice but to cut consumers from the grid in a period of 
colder-than-normal meteorological conditions. The situation 
was somewhat  alleviated  by the decreased  amount  of 
industrial demand resulting from the economic slowdown. 
As  a  result, the Commission  was prompted  into action. 
One part of  this action was the involvement. with the help 
of  the European gas Industry, In the resolution of  the dispute 
(26) According t'o preliminary results from DG ENER and the Gas Coordlnarlon Group. 
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Source: Eurosrar (2010, monthly aggregated  dora) 
of 2009 and the resumption of gas flows, including reverse 
flows where that was technically possible. Another aspect or 
the action was  the  launching of the  European Energy 
Programme  for  Recovery  (EEPR ),  designed  especially  to 
finance projects helping to enhance the interconnectivity of 
gas systems of  the EU Member  States. The European Commission 
sidelined E 1.39 billion towards a number of  gas infrastructure 
projects as  part of its E 3.98  billion stimulus  package of 
investment in energy-related projects in 2009 and 2010:'  '. 
The Commission also strengthened the legal framework on 
security or gas supply in the EU in December 2010'28 • The 
focus lies on prevention and crisis management in the internal 
energy market and it  ensures that in case of a crisis  gas 
supplies are guaranteed to protected customers, in particular 
to households. The Regulation requires all Member States to 
take effective action well in advance to prevent and mitigate 
the consequences of potential disruptions to gas supplies by 
establishing  national  preventive and  emergency plans. 
It establishes infrastructure and supply standards aiming to 
provide incentives for investment in infrastructure necessary 
for security of  supply in the internal energy market  At the EU 
level, the Regulation supports  regional cooperation and 
strengthens the role of the Gas  Coordination Group as  a 
mechanism for Member States and industry to work together 
to deal  effectively  with  any major gas  disruptions which 
might arise. 
The construction of  a reliable, transparent and interconnected 
energy market in the EU is the cornerstone put in place to 
deal with a variety of complex issues, including security of 
supply. The third legislative package in the domain of  energy 
policy was adopted in 2009. It  Includes Regulations and 
1 27) More on  information on the EEPR can be found here: h rrp:l/eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:201 0:0191 :FIN:EN:PDF 
(28) Regulation No 994/2010 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of20  October 2010 concerning  measures to  safeguard security of gas supply and repealing 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC entered Into force an  2 December  2010: http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHrml.do?uri=OJ:L:20 1  0:295:SOM:EN:HTML Directives of the European Parliament and  of the Council 
aiming to ensure that all European citizens can take advantage 
of the numerous benefits provided by a truly competitive 
energy market. 
With regard to gas  market developments, the decline in EU 
domestic production of natural gas outpaced the reduction 
of gross inland consumption as  more and more production 
fields were  entering into  post-peak  phase. For example, 
between 2005  and 2009, consumption fell by 7 o/o  whereas 
domestic production decreased by 19%.  The EU's annual gas 
FIGURE 54 
balance continued to deteriorate slowly as total imports rose 
steadily.  In that five year period the part of  total imports 
covered on average 76.5% of the gross inland consumption 
of natural gas in the EU. 
The consequences of the recent recession were apparent on 
the recorded volumes for gross Inland consumption and 
imports in 2009. Whereas both registered a fall of 6% and 3% 
with respect to the corresponding 2008 levels, the general 
trend of increasing reliance on external  supply sources was 
confirmed. 
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Note: Data  for  2009 ore based on provisional monthly balances for  production, consumption, Imports, exports and  changes of  stocks. 
According to Eurostot data,  EU gas imports amounted to 
347.5 bcm in 2008, the most importanttrading partners being 
the Russian  Federation (38.8 o/o),  Norway (28.5 %) and Algeria 
(14.3 o/o). The combined part of  Nigeria, Libya, Qatar, E gypt and 
Trinidad & Tobago was less than 12 o/o. 
The EU's import dependency'  increased from 48% in 2000, 
to 58 o/o  in  2005,  to 64 o/o  in  2009. Import  dependency is 
increasing in most of the Member States.  For the period 
covering 2007-2009 some of  the more notable evolutions took 
place in the UK '-'
0
' and Bulgaria  . 
(29) Import dependency Is defined by  Eurostor as the ratio of  net  imports to the sum of  gross inland consumption and  the change In storage levels. Data for  2009 
is based on provisional monthly balances for  production, consumption, imports, exports and changes of  stocks. Source: Eurostat Energy  Stacistlcs. 
(30) The import dependency rose from 0.20 to 0.31 resulting from an increase of  imports(+  32 %) and  fall in production  (18 %). 
(31) The import  dependency went from 0.92 to  0.99 as a consequence of  a significonr reduction of  domestic production which outpaced the fall of  imports and 
consumption (respecrively 25 %and 30  %) resulting from the gas crisis in January  2009. According to  Eurostat data the year-on-year  production fell by 95.3% 
as rhe offshore Galata gas field was depleted and  is now  being converted into a gas storage facility. FIGURE 55 
EU-27, NATURAL GAS IMPORT DEPENDENCY BY MEMBER STATE (2007-2009) 
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As  the volume of imported gas  into the  EU  is  gradually 
increasing, Member States are trying to diversify the supply 
sources and  routes as  much as  possible.  The  next graph 
illustrates that tendency. In the last 20 years, the relative part 
FIGURE 56 
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of liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries in the total volume 
of Imported natural gas in the EU  rose  from  10 o/o  to 25 o/o 
before registering a small decrease in the first half of  2010. 
EU-27, IMPORTS OF NATURAL GAS (in bern,%) (1990-2010) 
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Note: The 2010 values are  indicative, based on data for the first six months of  the  year. 
The number of EU trading partners in the domain of LNG is 
growing with supplies coming from Norway, Qatar, Algeria, 
Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Oman, Malaysia,  Australia, the United Arab  Emirates  and 
recently Yemen. Some of these partners have committed 
significant upstream investment in order to increase their 
production capacity and the number of  liquefaction facilities. 
The number of  LNG entry points in the EU is growing as well 
with new regasification plants coming on stream in France 
(Fos  Cavaou).  Italy  (Adriatic  LNG),  UK  (Dragon  LNG, 
South Hook Phase I and II). 3.2.1.  Wholesale markets 
Between January 2009 and June 2010, market participants 
continued to  exchange volumes of natural  gas  on  the 
European hubs. While new trading places emerged in Central 
FIGURE 57 
Europe ''' and  the German venues were in rhe process of 
consolidation ·, the traditional hubs in North Western Europe 
- NBP (UK), ITF (the Netherlands) and Zeebrugge (Belgium) 
remained the most  active trading places. 
BE, NL, UK, MONTHLY CHURN RATES (1/2008·6/2010) 
- NBP (UK) old methodology  - NBP (UK) new methodology  - Zeebrugge  (BE)  - TIF  (NL) 
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Sources: Huberator (BE); Gas Transport  Services (NL); National Grid  (UK); l&l Platts 
Note: The definition of  the UK churn rate was modified as from November  2009. Following a change in the volume categories reported 
by National  Grid, the new  churn formula uses daily nominations instead of  throughput. 
For those  three hubs, the relative part of the combined 
day-ahead turnover with respect to gross inland consumption 
in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK rose from 66.3% in 
the first half of  2008 to 92.1% in the first half  of2010, the most 
traded market being the National Balancing Point in the UK. 
Throughout 2009 and the first half  of  2010, the ratio of  traded 
volume (cleared  through the exchange clearing  houses) 
to the volume of  gas physically delivered on the hub (known 
as  the churn rate),  remained in  the  historical ranges for 
Zeebrugge and ITF while it increased for the NBP. For this 
market, a new pattern is emerging with the churn increasing 
during the storage filling season in the summer. 
Market participants continued to trade actively despite the 
difficult conditions and the decreased volumes of industrial 
demand during the economic slowdown. The stable levels of 
the chum and the rising part of  the day-ahead turnover in the 
gross  inland consumption demonstrates the confidence 
which participants have in the pricing signals from the market 
on which they are basing their economic decision-making. 
(32) The Central European Gas Hub  (CEGH) In  Baumgarten. Austria. 
(33) NetConnect Germany and  Gospool. 
Spot markets 
European  spot prices for natural  gas  experienced three 
different phases in the period covering 2008 ro 2010. Until the 
autumn of 2008, energy prices were increasing, fuelled by a 
steady growth of  demand, especially in South Eastern Asia. 
In that period, the month-ahead Brent price rose to S  147 I bbl 
and rhe coal CIF ARA contract reached € 130 I mt. At the same 
time,  the average monthly price for natural gas on the NBP 
reached € 29.42 I  MWh. FIGURE 58 
PRICES OF COMPETITIVE FUELS AND THE PRICE OF GAS (In EUR and EUR/MWh) {1/2008-6/2010) 
(right  axis) NBP average price (EUR/MWh) 
- (right  axis) DE border (EUR/MWh) 
- (left axis) Coal CJF  ARA Spot EUR/t 
- (left axis) Brent Spot EUR/bbl 
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As the financial fallout  triggered by the financial crisis in the 
second part of 2008 was spreading to the  real economy, 
prices  of energy commodities went through a significant 
correction. In a couple of months they lost roughly half  of 
their value. 
After a low point was reached at the beginning of  2009, prices 
of coal, oil  and  gas  started  to grow again  as  the world 
economy was embarking on a slow recovery. 
During the observed period, spot gas prices in Europe were 
reacting to specific supply and demand conditions on the 
different markets.  In general, market participants in Austria, 
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK were 
taking on arbitrage opportunities, adjusting utilisation rates of 
interconnection  points  whenever a short term premium 
emerged with commercial flows increasing from a low to high 
price area. More detailed information on developments in the 
EU markets for natural gas can  be found in  the Quarterly 
Reports on European Gas Markets (QREGaM)' 4•• 
(34) Publicly available at: hrtp:// ec.europa.eulenergylobservatorylgas/gas_en.htm 
2009  2010  35 
5 
0 
Sources: C> Platts (Brent, coal, NBPJ; BAFA (DE  border) 
Prices  of gas  delivered  under  long  term  contractual 
obligations'  ' had a similar evolution to spot prices traded on 
European hubs. Gas prices under long term contracts (L TC) are 
indexed  with respect to the price of crude oil or refined 
products, lagged by several months. This could explain the 
reason why LTC prices were also lagging those of the spot gas. 
The next graph shows the evolution of the price differential of 
gas delivered under LTC or on the spot. Because of  the lagged 
parameters used in the  pricing formula, the L TC gas price was 
at its highest  value in Q4 2008 and 01 2009. At the same time, 
spot  prices  were  falling  in  reaction to strong  demand 
contraction and stable supply conditions. This development 
prompted the emergence of a significant margin between the 
two pricing approaches. While spot and LTC gas were priced 
at similar levels in the first half of 2008, spot  gas became 
much more competitive in the following months. 
(35) The long term gas prices are Illustrated by the German border price in the graph above. FIGURE 59 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DELTA LTC PRICE AND ZEEBRUGGE SPOT PRICE 
(in EUR/MWh) (1/2008-6/2010) 
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Source: © Platts 
Note: The Gas Contract Indicator (GCI) Is used ro represent the price of  gas delivered under long-term contractual obligation in the Norrh 
Western European region. The Zeebrugge hub  in  Belgium is used to represent the price of  gas exchanged on the spo1 marker. 
The price difference reached almost  €16 I  MWh in March 
2009. By the end of  June 2010, LTCs still exceeded spot prices 
by more than €4 I MWh. The persisting price differential led 
more  and  more  European  companies  to  look  for  a 
renegotiation of their LTCs, especially in the area of reducing 
the amount of  take-or-pay (TOP) obligations. 
LNG spot deliveries played an important role as a competitive 
source of gas  pushing down spot prices. In 2009, the US 
outpaced the Russian Federation as the biggest producer of 
national gas,  due  to strong  growth  in  production from 
FIGURE 60 
LNG PRICES (in USD/MMBtu) (1/2008-6/2010) 
unconventional gas sources. As the United States remained 
well supplied in gas "' 1 , the EU emerged as the highest price 
area in the Atlantic basin. This also led to  a gradual decoupling 
of the US Henry Hub price and European spot prices. 
The large number of  LNG cargoes that were attracted to the 
relatively high EU prices brought additional supply flexibility 
whenever there was more need for gas.  This was for example 
the case in the winter months of 2009 and 2010 when colder 
than average temperatures in North Western Europe triggered 
a rise in the residential demand for heating. 
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Sources: • Euros1a1 COM  EXT; ••  Gas  Strategies 
Note: • "Avg EU" is a weighted average  price  for monthly  LNG deliveries In: Belgium, Portugal, Spain, UK. Italy (from  January 2009) and  France 
(from January 2010) os reported by  Eurostat. *" The formula for  calculaling monthly  prices in Japan, Korea and  the US was modified In 04  2009. 
Previously these prices were an  average of  prices charged  by  different suppliers. Starting from October 2009 , the  averages are weighted 
by the  monthly  LNG deliveries of  each supplier. 
(36) The term •gas glut• has become common usage  to  describe actual  global  gas market  conditions. Forward markets 
In mid-2008 the UK and Belgian year-ahead contracts were 
priced at a € 1.5 I MWh premium with respect to the Dutch 
hub. Later on, the three contracts were traded close to each 
other. Among the reasons for this evolution was the relatively 
quicker reaction of the TIF price to the fall in demand while 
FIGURE 61 
market operators in Belgium and the UK were, at that time, 
more concerned about 2009 supply. As construction of the 
new LNG terminals was kept on schedule and deliveries of 
North Sea gas were stable, supply concerns dissipated quickly 
and the year-ahead contracts fell from €40 I  MWh In June 
2008 to around € 15 I MWh in March 2010 and then increased 
again to € 20 I MWh in June 2010. 
EUROPEAN 1sr YEAR FORWARD HUB PRICES (in EUR/MWh) (112008-6/2010) 
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3.2.2.  Retail markets 
The prices of  gas, net of  taxes, for the three household bands 
of  E urostar  · were relatively close to the average EU levels in 
the period from the first half of  2008 to the first half of  2010. 
The price ralio of the Member States with the highest and 
lowest price level was 5.05  for the most modest group of 
consumers (band 0 1),  while the corresponding values  for 
groups 02 and 03 were 3.14 and 2.85 respectively. Excepting 
Romania, a Member State whose domestic production allows 
low prices to be set for retail household and industrial users, 
end user prices appeared even closer to the EU average  . 
((37) See Figure 61 above. 
- (right axis) NBP-TTF 1 YA differential 
- (right axis) NBP-ZEE 1 YA differential 
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Source: e Platts 
When measured in eurocents per kWh, 7 out of  the 8 Member 
States  with  the  lowest average  prices  for  household 
customers were still New Member States. Only the UK posted 
similar price levels. However, if the  price  is  measured in 
purchasing power parity standards, these countries rend to 
move up the price ranking order. 
Concerning the smallest consumption band Dl, Danish and 
Irish prices appeared r€latively cheaper than what would be 
suggested by  the position of rhese Member States  in  the 
overall ranking. Likewise, French and Slovak consumers from 
bands 02 and 03 seemed to  enjoy relatively low prices. 
(38) The corresponding values for bands 0 I, 02  and  03  become 2.92, 1.98 and 1.91 respectively. FIGURE 62 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD NATURAL GAS PRICES (WITHOUT  TAXES) FOR THREE EUROSTAT 
ANNUAL CONSUMPTION BANDS (in EUR cent/kWh) (1ST half of  2008 - PT  half  of 2010) 
I I  Band D3:  Consumption > SS.SSMWh 
I I  Band D2:  5.55 MWh <Consumption< 55.55MWh  I I  Band Dl :Consumption < 5.555 MWh 
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Source: Eurostat Energy Statistics 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Finland are missing. EU average data for the first  semester of  2010 are preliminary. 
As of  the time of  drafting of  the report, do  to were still  missing for Denmark, Hungary and  Spain. 
Similar to the results shown in the previous Annual Report'", 
the dispersion of industrial gas prices, net of taxes, around the 
E U average  was  even  less  pronounced. The  highest-to-
cheapest price ratios were 1.52, 1 .62. 1.61 and 1.48 for the four 
reported bands of industrial consumers  starting from the 
smaller (in terms of consumption volumes) consumers. 
For Member S tates with functioning retail markets this result 
may suggest that industrial consumers were priced against 
FIGURE 63 
competitors with similar profiles from other Member States. 
Likewise, it seems that where retail prices were still regulated, 
industrial users  were paying according  to  an  oil-indexed 
formula. The use of  a similar pricing mechanism produced a 
harmonisation effect across consumption bands and across 
Member States. 
AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL PRICES FOR NATURAL GAS (WITHOUT TAXES) FOR FOUR EUROSTAT 
ANNUAL CONSUMPTION BANDS (in EUR cent/kWh) {1 5r half  of  2008- 1sT half  of 2010) 
II  Band 1 4: 27.77 GWh <Consumption < 277 .77 GWh  I I  Band 1 2 : 277.77 MWh <Consumption<  2.77 GWh 
I I  Band 1 3:2.77  GWh <Consumption < 27.77 GWh  I I  Band 1 1 :Consumption < 277.77 MWh 
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Source: Eurostat Energy Statistics 
Note: Dora for  Cyprus, Greece, Malta  and  Austria is missing.  Finland reports price data on industrial  bands 3 and  4, but  not  on Industrial bonds 1  and  2. 
EU overage data  for the flrrr semesterof2010 is preliminary. As af  the time of  drafting of  the repor4 data was still missing for Denmark, France, Italy and  Hungary. 
(39) http:/ /ec.europa.eu/energy!observatory/annual_reports!annual_reporrs_en.htm During the observed period some Member States continued 
to regulate retail prices of  natural gas for groups of  industrial 
and  household  consumers.  Cross  subsidisation  across 
consumer groups distorts prices and is usually detrimental for 
competition. The Commission considers these practices as 
very negative as  they are  not in line with  internal market 
principles.  It has already started a number of infringement 
procedures. 
3.3.  Market developments 
in the electricity sector of  the EU 
The gradual integration of EU wholesale electricity markets 
continued throughout 2009 and the first half of  2010. Several 
important developments for the functioning of a single 
electricity market took place during the observed period. 
The third legislative package in the domain of  the EU energy 
policy was approved by the European Parliament  and the 
Council in July 2009. It establishes two institutions which will 
have a central role in the design of the single European 
market for electricity. 
One institution is the European Network of  Transmission Sysrem 
Operators for Electricity  (EN SO-E):·"'. ENSO-E  became fully 
operational in July 2009, regrouping 42 TSOs from 34 states 
and  replacing  all  existing  European  associations  of 
Transmission System Operators (TSO). Its main role is to ensure 
optimal management of  the electricity transmission network 
and to facilitate the trade and supply of electricity across 
borders  in  the  EU. The  first ENTSO-E  1  0-year  network 
development plan was delivered in 2010. 
The other institution is the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators  (ACER)' · ·. From  March  2011  ACER  will 
become fully operational and will play a key role in the EU 
electricity and natural gas markets. Its competences include. 
among others, a participation in the preparation of  European 
network rules and taking decisions on conditions for access 
and security of  cross border infrastructure. The Agency will 
coordinate the work of  National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
and will give advice on various energy related issues to the 
European institutions. 
The Commission also started work on a new initiative for the 
Integrity and transparency of  traded energy markets. A formal 
public consultation was launched in May 2010 concerning the 
Information on demand and supply data, the monitoring on 
traded markets and transactional data requirements. the 
applicability of  existing market abuse regulations to address 
market integrity  issues  on the energy markets  and the 
enforcement of  market conduct rules. 
Alongside these  developments, stakeholders in  the  EU 
electricity markets worked in  close  cooperation  in  the 
framework of the different  Regional Initiatives. Box 4 illustrates 
the activities  related to linking the Central Western and the 
Nordic regions. 
(40) Regulation IEC) No 714 I 2009  on  conditions for  access to the network for cross-bor der exchanges established the structure and functions of  EN  SO·  E . 
(4 1 ) Established via Regulation (EC) No 773/2009. A number of  factors could explain such a decrease. 
Such an occurrence may appear counterintuitive parallel  to 
opening  the  EU  wholesale  markets  and  enhancing 
commercial exchanges across  the  border. However, two 
elements could at least partly explain such an evolution: 
First, comparing 2008 to 2009 values, (i.e. pre- and in- recession 
data), It seems that the relative fall in exports and Imports 
matched that of gross inland consumption'4 1• It can therefore 
be argued that cross-border exchanges fell  roughly as much 
as consumption. Weaker demand might  also create conditions 
of well supplied markets  where it is  easier for domestic 
capacity to meet consumer requirements. 
However, in the longer period of 2005-2009, consumption fell 
by less than 4% whereas exports and imports decreased by 
14.7% and 12.4% respectively, implying that there may be 
another factor explaining  this  evolution. According  to 
preliminary results from the Markel Observatory for Energy, 
rhis factor may be related to the gradual tendency of EU 
FIGURE 64 
wholesale prices ro align with each other. IF such is the case. 
incentives to trade I exchange electricity across the border 
may be reduced. 
Whatever may be the reason  behind the recent decrease in 
EU exports and imports of electricity, the next graph shows 
that for the majority of  Member States the amount of  energy 
exchanged  with  neighbouring countries  compared  to 
consumption  remains well  above  10%. Moreover,  for a 
number of Member States like Slovenia, Finland and Greece, 
the relative  part of external  trade  in  the gross  inland 
consumption of electricity is actually increasing. As a rule. 
the Member States which are most open to cross-border 
trade  seem  to be countries  of modest size  strategically 
positioned between big producing and consuming centres 
at the heart of  the continent. The Baltic countries represent 
another Interesting case.  It seems  that the closing down 
of Unit 2 of the lgnalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania 
increased  exports and imports of electricity,  especially 
in 2009. 
TOTAL ELECTRICITY EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (as% of gross consumption) (2006-2009) 
II  2006  II  2001  II  2008  II  2009 
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3.3.1.  Wholesale markets 
For the group of Member States with functioning wholesale 
markets~"\ it seems that the countries with voluntary trading 
schemes'- are relatively more open to cross border exchange 
of electricity than the countries  with  mandatory pools'
4 
• 
For the former, the cross border ratio for 2008- 2010 was 
between 16% and 19o/o; for the latter it  was in the 10 o/o - 13% 
range. However, the amount of electricity exchanged across 
the border may be independent of  the type of  trading venue 
for the wholesale markets. It may have more to do with the 
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Source: Eurostot Energy Statistics; Doto for Molto ore missing 
fact that islands and peninsulas tend to be less connected 
to  the mainland  of the European  continent and so  the 
opportunities to exchange electricity are fewer. 
While the relative part of external trade remained stable 
between 2008  and the  first half of 2010,  the day-ahead 
turnover of the organized electricity exchanges continued 
to increase. 
(44) The corresponding voles for consumption, exports and  imports are respectively -4.8 %, -5.6%  ond  -4.7%. 
145) And  for which dora is available. 
(46) Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic. Denmark. Finland, France. Germany, the Netherlands. Poland. Romania. Sfovakia, Sweden, United  Kingdom and Norway. 
(47) Greece, Italy, Portugal and  Spain. FIGURE 65 
DAY-AHEAD TURNOVER AND THE SUM OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF ELECTRICITY 
(as% of gross inland consumption) (1/2008-6/2010) 
- Turnover  (Member States with mandatory  wholesale markets) 
- Turnover (Member States with voluntary wholesale markets) 
- Exports+ imports  of electricity (Member States with voluntary wholesale  markets) 
- Exports+ imports of  electricity (Member States with mandatory  wholesale markets) 
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Sources: Eurosrot; Plotts; Operator  trhu s elektrnou; Toworowo Gieldo Energii S.A.; Operotul Pietei de Energie Electrico din Romania; Hellenic TSO. 
Reported Member  States with voluntary wholesale  markets include:  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany , 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom and  Norway. Reported Member  Stores with mandatory  wholesale markets 
include Greece, Italy, Portugal and  Spain. 
Regarding the subgroup of  Member States with voluntary 
wholesale markers, the total traded volume on the day-ahead 
segment went from 270.72 TWh in the first half of 2008 to 
314.30 TWh in the first half of  2010. The churn rate went from 
an average value of  0.22 in January 2008 to 0.28 in June 2010, 
representing a rise of almost a quarter within 30 months. 
While consumption of electricity was low in 2009, the strong 
performance of the churn suggests that the turnover of the 
exchanges  remained  robust  despite  the  reduction  in 
industrial demand for electricity. 
The subgroup of  Member States with mandatory wholesale 
markets experienced a gradual decrease of  the day-ahead 
turnover. For example, in the first half  of 2010 the day-ahead 
total volume of  the pool markets stood at 238.16 TWh, about 
6 and 40 TWh less than in the corresponding periods of 2009 
and 2008. Compared  to  gross  inland consumption, the 
turnover represented 66%  in June 2010, about 10% less than 
it did in January 2008. 
Spot markets 
Similar to the price evolution of other energy commodities 
in the period between January 2008 and June 2009, the 
electricity Pan European Price (PEP) index of  Platts registered a 
three phase movement, including a steep rise and decline 
followed by a slow recovery.  The scale of up  and down 
movements was comparable across energy commodities. FIGURE 66 
SPOT PRICES OF ENERGY COMMODITIES (January 2008 = 100) {1/2008-6/2010) 
- Platts PEP  - Brent Crude Spot (EUR/bbl)  - Coal CIF ARA (EUR/mtl  - NBP Spot (EUR/MWh) 
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Coal and crude oil were among the first commodities to peak 
in mid 2008, appreciating by about 35% in 6 months. Crude 
oil was  also  among  the first to level after the steep fall 
triggered by the financial crisis. In the second half of 2008 
the Brent average monthly price fell  from €85.17 I  bbl to 
€ 30.13 I bbl, falling by a factor of 2.8.  By the beginning of 
2009 oil prices started to recover and in March 2010 they 
reached the levels recorded at the beginning of  2008. 
The electricity spot price followed a path which was similar to 
that observed for natural gas, with a rise,  fall and recovery 
lagging by several  months with respect to oil and coal. 
Contrary to gas however, the electricity index peaked higher 
2009  2010 
Source:© Platts 
From January to September 2008, the average monthly PEP 
Index rose by € 30,  reaching € 95.83 I  MWh while the NBP 
contract  for  natural  gas  appreciated  from  € 24.52  to 
€ 29.84 I  MWh. Later on, the PEP  reached  a low value of 
€ 36.13 I MWh in June 2009 (-46% with respect to the start of 
2008) whereas the NBP  spot was traded ar € 7.61  I  MWh in 
September,  losing about 70% of its January 2008  value. 
This  development suggests that supply conditions were 
tighter and  the demand recovered faster in the wholesale 
market for electricity than that for gas. 
Financial markets 
and was quicker to level off  after the decline, both scale and  The volatility on the far end of the forward curves for EU 
time wise. Detailed information on price developments can  electricity contracts was comparable but smaller than that 
be found in the Quarterly Reports  on European  Electricity  observed for spot prices. 
Markets of  the Market Observatory for Energy'
4
"'. 
(48) Publicly available here: hrrp:l/ec.europa.eulenergy!observotory!electricity!electricity_en.htm FIGURE 67 
MONTHLY AVERAGE PRICES FOR TWO-YEAR BASELOAD ELECTRICITY FORWARDS 
(January 2008 = 100) (1/2008-6/2010) 
- DEY+2  - FRY+2  - NLY+2  - UK summer Y+2  - NP  2-year ahead 
160  2008  2009  2010 
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•Note: The yearly ba~eload  con traces for Germany, France and Netherlands as well as the ~ummer  sea~on  con trace for UK are roll-over calendar 
forwards. The baseload contract for the Nordpool region is a standard  year a/lead. 
Excepting the benchmarks for the UK and the Nordpool 
regions. the two year-ahead contracts appreciated much like 
the corresponding day-ahead contracts in the first part of 
2008.  Contrary  to the spot prices. in  the decline phase, 
the two year ahead forwards lost  less than 20% of  their  values 
from the start of  2008. By the end of  June 2010 they were also 
closer to the January 2008 levels than spot prices. 
In  2009 and  2010,  forward  prices  remained  mostly in 
contango"' , implying that market participants were more 
optimistic about future prospects of  the EU electricity markets 
than the current post recession situation. 
3.3.2.  Retail markets 
Average end consumer prices for industrial and household 
users increased during the observed period, reflecting with 
some lag the evolution of wholesale prices. Some of the 
exceptions to that rule were France and Ireland with lower 
domestic and industrial prices in the first half of 2010 than 
in the first half of  2008. 
Household electricity prices, net of  taxes, for the  five reported 
consumption bands of Eurostat were quite dispersed across 
Member States. For example, an average consumer from the 
lowest consumption band Da paid an average price in the 
range of €0,07 I kWh - €0,39 I kWh for the period covering 
January 2008 to June 2010 depending on his or her country 
of residence. 
The ratio of the lowest (Bulgaria) to highest (Ireland) price 
paid by a consumer from band Da stood at 5.7. For higher 
consumption bands the ratio of most expensive to cheapest 
price decreased, going from 2.9 and 2.5 for bands Db and De 
to 2.4 and 3.2 for bands Dd and De. The price dispersion was 
reinforced by the policies of some Member States to keep 
prices regulated for some industrial and household consumers. 
(49) A situation of  contango arises when  the  closer ra  maturity  contract llas  a lower  price than the contract which is longer to maturity  on  the forward curve. FIGURE68 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY PRICES (WITHOUT TAXES) FOR FIVE EUROSTAT 
CONSUMPTION BANDS (in EUR cent/kWh) (1sT half of 2008 - 1sT half of 2010) 
I  Band De:  Consumption> 15 000  kWh 
I I  Band Dd: 5 000  kWh < Consu mptlon  < 15 000 kWh 
II Band De: 2 500 kWh<  Consumption< 5 000  kWh 
120 
100 
.r::.  80 
~ 
"  60 
~ 
a:  m  40 
20 
0 
I I  Band Db: 1 000 kWh < Consumption < 2 500 kWh 
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Source: Eurostat Energy Statistics 
Note: Retail electricity price daca (without taxes) for households is not  available for Italy. EU average  data for the flrsc semester of  2010 
is preliminary. As of  the time of  drafting of  the rep  orr, data was still  missing for Greece. Denmark. Hungary. Spain and  Malta. 
In the UK, retail consumers from the lowest band (band Da) 
paid relatively cheaper prices than what would be suggested 
by the overall position of  that  Member State. The same was 
also true for the biggest household consumers (band De) 
in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg. Finland and Belgium as 
well as for consumers from the middle bands (Db, De and Dd) 
in Portugal, Germany and Spain. 
Seven of the ten countries with lowest prices for household 
consumers were New Member States. However, the ranking 
changes significantly if purchasing power parity standards are 
used Instead of  euros as a metric for the monetary unit. In that 
case, Member States from Eastern and Central Europe tend 
ro move up  in the ranking. 
The price dispersion between cheap and expensive prices. 
net of taxes, for industrial electricity  consumers covering the 
period from the start of  2008 until mid-2010, was in general 
smaller than the one observed for household prices. FIGURE 69 
AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRICITY PRICES (WITHOUT TAXES) FOR SIX EUROSTAT 
CONSUMPTION BANDS (in EUR cent/kWh) (1 5r half of 2008 - 15r half of 2010) 
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Note: Retail electricity price data (without taxes) for industrial users are nor available for Italy. Data for industrial users. 
Band 'If• for Luxembourg is nor  available. 
Industrial consumers from the lower consumption bands'"' 
were more closely distributed around the EU average than the 
big industrial users of electricity. For example,  the most 
expensive to cheapest price ratio for consumers in band Ia 
and /b  were respectively 2.72  and 2.73. When it comes to 
bands /e and If. the corresponding price ratios varied from 3.01 
and 3.34. The reason for this development may be the fact 
that  larger consumers in open and  non-regulated  retail 
markets may find it easier to switch suppliers, choosing from 
different competing offers. 
(SO ) As defined In the Eurostat  Energy  Statistics database. 
Denmark and the UK  were  among the countries where 
industrial  prices for low consumption bands were relatively 
cheaper when compared to the overall  position of the 
respective Member State. Big industrial users in Slovenia were 
enjoying a similar situation. 
CD This chapter of the 2009 annual report focused on those 
countries that play important role either as key suppliers to 
the EU  (such  as  Russia,  Norway, Algeria)  or as  important 
emerging supplier and transit counties (such as the Caspian 
Region and Central Asia, Turkey, Brazil) The current report 
continues  to  present  the  most important energy  and 
economic features of some countries  playing a major role 
in supply  and  trade  of  energy  product s with the  EU. 
Four countries  have been chosen to be presented briefly, 
namely the United States, Canada, Qatar and Libya. 
The  EU  has  different kinds of cooperation  with  these 
countries. 
The cooperation between the USA and the EU in the energy 
domain is coordinated within the framework of the EU-US 
Energy Council, a bilateral energy dialogue, focusing on the 
questions of  energy security, technologies and policies. 
Energy cooperation between Canada and the EU takes place 
in the framework of  EU-Canada High Level Cooperation and 
under the Euratom Agreement in areas of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy,  enrichment,  nuclear and  fusion  related 
scientific research. 
A  chapter on  cooperation  in  energy  matters  has  been 
included in the Free  Trade Agreement (FTA)  negotiations 
with Libya. 
FIGURE 70 
4.1 .  The United States of America 
In 2008, the United States of America (USA) was the world's 
largest energy consuming country  . In that year the gross 
inland  energy consumption of the  LJSA  was  231 3  Mtoe 
(millions of tons of oil equivalent), compared to 1799 Mtoe 
for the EU. 
In 2008, 26% of gross inland consumption was imported, 
amounting to 601  Mtoe  '. 
84% of  the US's energy imports were crude oil and petroleum 
products while natural gas imports amounted ro 13% in 2009. 
The volume of energy exports of the USA was about one 
fourth of  that of  1m ports in 2009. It exports mainly petroleum 
products (53%), coal (22%) and natural gas (15%). 
As  the next chart shows,  the energy mix of the USA  is 
predominantly based on the consumption of fossil  fuels, 
making up  8S% of  all energy consumption in 2008. 
USA, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY (in Mtoe, %) (2008) 
Nuclear  218 34(10%) 
Natural 
gas liquids 60  55 (31101 
Natural 
gas  542-n  (24%1 
Hydro  22.08(1110) 
Refinery 
42 12 (2 %)  feedstocks 
545 76(24%  Coal 
Combustible 
renewables 
84 7714 'li 1  and waste 
(33 %)  Crude oil 
Total = 2 312.84 Mtoe  Source: tJ OECDIIEA2010 
(51) It  is worth mentioning thor rhe lEA's World Energy Outlook  2010 suggests thor according to  prelimmary  data China overc ook  rhe US in energy consumption 
(52) Source: US Energy Information Admmimarion -EtA Compared to the energy mix of  the EU-27, solid fuels (namely 
coal) represented a higher  share in the energy mix of  the USA 
while the proportion of  crude oil was less than in Europe. 
The importance of nuclear energy (10%) or renewable energy 
sources  (5 o/o)  is  less  than  in the EU-27  (13 o/o  and 8 o/o, 
respectively). The  share  of  coal  was  especially  high  In 
electricity generation (46 o/o)  in 2008 in the US as opposed 
to that of  the EU-27 (26.7 o/o in the same year). 
FIGURE 71 
During the last two decades, the final energy consumption of 
the USA experienced an almost permanently increasing trend, 
although in 2008 annual consumption was  less  than  the 
preceding year. The largest fall in consumption occurred in 
the transport sector (-4.3% compared to 2007) which might 
have been in conjunction with high fuel prices in 2008. 
USA, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1992-2008) 
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As the chart showing total primary energy production reveals,  consumption  is  heavily  import-dependent,  giving  less 
the importance of  coal in production is even higher than In  Importance to crude oil in production than In consumption). 
gross inland consumption (while crude oil based  energy 
FIGURE 72 
USA, TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION {in Mtoe, %) (2008) 
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13%  Nuclear 
1%  Hydro 
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35%  coal 
Source: e OECD/IEA 2010 The USA's  more fossil fuel-dominated energy mix leads to 
higher greenhouse gas emissions: in 2007  the US emitted 
191 Mt COjcapita compared to 90 Mt CO/capita in the EU. 
Besides significant energy consumption and production the 
USA has huge reserves of energy. The country possesses 1.4% 
of  the world's proven crude oil reserves, ranking it  twelfth in 
the world. Regarding natural gas reserves the US possesses 
the sixth largest reserve (proven or probable reserves,  see 
figure 88) in the world, with 3.7% of  the global stocks and 
amounting to 6900 bcm at the end of  2008. If the 'technically 
recoverable' reserves are also taken into account, the total 
reserves amount to 48 Tcm of which more than 60% is 
unconventional gas'  ). 
FIGURE 73 
According to data of the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) of the USA, in 2008 the country possessed the largest 
recoverable reserve of coal in the world (262.000 Mt or 28.7% 
of  the total world reserves). 
Taking a look at production figures on the next chart, the USA 
was the second largest natural gas producer behind Russia in 
the world in 2008. As a consequence of decreasing Russian 
production and further increase in that of  the USA the country 
became the number  one natural gas  producer in  2009. 
The country was  the  third  largest oil  producer in both 
2008 and 2009. 
USA, EVOLUTION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND RESERVES (in Mbbl, bern) (2006-2008) 
OIL 
Annual production (Mbbl) 
Production to date (Mbbl) 
Reserves (proven and probable) (Mbbl) 
GAS 
Annual production (bcm) 
Production to date (bcm) 
Reserves (proven and probable) (bcm) 
The United States is also an important energy trading partner 
for the EU-27. The import share of  fuels and mining products 
from the US (E 11.3 billion) was 7.1 % in 2009, the EU's exports 
of energy products (E 16.2billion) that year accounted for 7.9% 
of  overall exports to the US. 
(53} Source: US Energy Information Administration -EIA 
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EU, TRADE WITH UNITED STATES (in EUR million) (2009) 
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Taking a closer look at individual energy products, coal is the 
most traded energy product between the USA and the EU. 
According to lEA data, about 51% of all hard coal exported 
from the US was shipped to the EU while more than 14% of 
the EU-27's hard coal import  originated from the US. 
FIGURE 75 
transport 
equipment  Source: TRADE DG 
As  mentioned previously,  the country heavily depends on 
foreign crude oil sources and refined petroleum products also 
play a major role in its energy product exports. Looking at the 
country of  origin import structure of  oll products, the OPEC 
countries are the major suppliers of  the USA (with a 42% share 
In the overall import volume), followed by Canada, Mexico 
and Russia. The countries of the EU-27 had a minor share in 
2009 (5.8 %). 
USA, OIL AND OIL PRODUCT IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (in o/o) (2009) 
Other  13% 
OPEC 
United Kingdom 2%  42%  countries 
Colombia  2' ' 
Virgin Islands  2% 
Brazil  3% 
Russia  5% 
Mexico  10% 
21%  Canada 
Total = 42 647.1 Mbbl  Source: US Energy Information Admini5tration !EIAJ 
While the share of crude oil import was nearly 80% within  oil products exports show a completely different picture, 
petroleum products in both 2008 and 2009, the structure of  with an almost negligible share of  crude oil. FIGURE76 
USA, OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCT EXPORTS (in%) {2009) 
Other 
products  11.6%  29 llf  Distillate  fuel oil 
Crude oil  2-2"• 
Lubricants  2-8% 
Liquefied 
petroleum 
gases  4.9% 
Finished motor 
gasoline  9.7~'0 
Petroleum  20.5% Residual fuel oil 
coke  19.3% 
Total = 738.8 M bbl  Source: US Energy  lnformotlon Adminlstrarion (EtA) 
Refined  products, such  as  distillate and residual fuel oil,  In the case of  crude oil imports, the USA primarily depends on 
petroleum  coke  and  finished  motor oil,  dominated  the  OPEC member states.  In contrast, the country's petroleum 
exports of  US petroleum products in 2009, while the share  product export  structure was more diversified, although 
of  crude oil was small (2.2 %).  Mexico and Canada are the two major trade partners, similarly 
to the case of  crude oil imports. 
FIGURE 77 
USA, OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCT EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION (in %) {2009) 
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Almost all natural gas export (97 %) from the USA in 2009 was  and Mexico). The import of natural gas was also dominated 
through pipelines to the two neighbouring countries (Canada  by pipeline trade (with an 88% share in 2009). FlGURE 78 
USA, LNG IMPORTS 8Y COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (in %) (2009) 
Nigeria  2.9 ••• 
Norway  6.5% 
Egypt  35.5% 
Total = 12.8 bcm 
The import  sources of  LNG shipped  to the US show a duopolistic 
structure, with the two major players, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Egypt. Qatar, which is the world largest LNG producer country, 
played only a marginal role In US import supply. 
Within US gas production the share of unconventional gas 
has been steadily growing during the last two decades. 
In the beginning of the 1990s its share was around 10-15% 
and in  the last two years (2008 and 2009) the proportion 
of unconventional gas reached almost SO% of  all US natural 
gas production. 
4.2.  Canada 
Energy-intensive activities make up an important part of  the 
Canadian economy (e.g.: aluminium manufacturing, paper 
and pulp industries), with the result that Canada uses almost 
FIGURE 79 
2.8%  Qatar 
52.3%  Trinidad 
and  Tobago 
Source: US Energy lnformotion Admlnlscrotion (E/AJ 
twice as much energy to produce one unit of  GDP than the 
economies of  the EU-27. This energy Intensity can also be seen 
in  gross  inland  energy  consumption  or  electricity 
consumption per capita figures which are significantly higher 
than those or the EU-27 average (with values some 2.5 times 
the respective EU  value). The carbon-dioxide emission per 
capita (Mt CO/per  capita) value of  the country  was above 17.0 
in the last couple of  years, compared to 9.0 for the EU. 
The country's energy mix in 2008 was dominated by oil and 
natural gas, each  representing more than 30% of  gross Inland 
energy consumption. Coal and nuclear fuels were of minor 
importance, although both fuels exceeded 9% in the  energy  mix. 
Hydro power represented 12% of  consumption which is higher 
than the respective value of  both the EU-27 and the US. Indeed, 
hydro power represented 59% of  electricity  generation in 2008. 
CANADA, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION (energy mix) (in Mtoe, %) (2008) 
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Combustible 
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Total= 267.33 Mtoe 
Note: values under 7 %  ore not  presented. 
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4%  gas liquids 
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Source: 10 OECD I lEA 2070 The importance of  fossil fuels is much higher in the country's 
primary energy production than in that of the energy mix 
(89.4% of total  produced energy comes  from fossil  fuel 
resources whereas the share of fossils is only 74.7  %) which 
explains the country's strong net energy exporter position. 
In 2008,  Canada exported more than 133  Mtoe of energy 
products. 
FIGURE 80 
The evolution of  Canada's final energy consumption between 
1992 and 2008 can be seen on the next chart. The change in 
the annual final consumption in 2008 (a 1  % decrease)  was 
mainly driven by the fall in the industrial and transport sectors 
that made up more than 60% of the country's final energy 
consumption in 2008. The relative importance of  households 
in the final energy consumption slightly declined during this 
period while that of  the other sectors slightly increased. 
CANADA, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1992-2008) 
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The vast majority (97-98 %) of  Canada's fossil fuel exports are  integrated nature is In terms of  the electricity supply sources 
destined to the US, with which the country has very strong  of  the North-Eastern part of  the US as the largest cities on the 
inter-1  inkages in energy markets. An  example of this  shore of the Atlantic are supplied by Canadian power sources. 
FIGURE 81 
CANADA, TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (in Mtoe,%) (2008) 
Natural gas  35.6% 
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5.3%  gas liquids 
8.4 %  Coal 
2.7°'>  Solid biomass 
5.9%  Non-crude 
Nudear  6.1 ?o 
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Total = 404.55 Mtoe  Source: US Energy  Information Administration (£/A) 
Note: values under 1% ore nor  presented. Canada's importance from an  energy point of view mainly 
lies  In its huge unconventional crude oil  reserves.  As of 
January 2009 the country's crude reserves amounted  to 
178 billion barrels, of which only 5% is traditional crude oil, 
while the vast majori·ty can be found in tar sand deposits. 
This ranks Canada second behind Saudi Arabia in the world 
in terms of  crude oil reserves. 
Most of the oil sands of Canada are located in three major 
deposits in northern Alberta.  The Alberta deposits also 
contain at least 85% of the world's total bitumen reserves. 
The largest  bitumen deposit,  containing  about 80% of 
Canada's  bitumen  deposits, and  the only  one  suitable 
for surface mining, is the Athabasca Oil Sands. 
MAP3 
CANADA'S OIL SANDS AREAS 
Canada possessed around 1.750 billion cubic metres (bcm) of 
natural gas as of  January 2010, which is less than 1 %of  the 
world's proven reserves. However, its annual production was 
more than 170 bcm in 2008, amounting  to 5.5% of  the world's 
production in  2008. The  country uses  about half of its 
indigenous production; the oL her half is exported, almost 
exclusively to the US. Similarly to oil production, the majority 
of gas extraction is concentrated in Alberta and in the Arctic 
regions, namely in the Valley of  Mackenzie.  The production of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and unconventional gases such 
Canada's oil production (including all liquids) was 3.22 million 
bbl/day in 2009. This  is  the sixth biggest daily production 
in the world (about one third of  the value of  top oil producer 
Russia). Canada's  oil production has  steadily risen over the 
past two decades (in  1990 it slightly exceeded  2 million 
barrels per day), as new oil sands and offshore projects have 
come on-stream to replace aging, mature fields. 
In 2008, oil sands production represented approximately half of 
Canada's total crude oil production. The Athabasca oil sands 
deposit in northern Alberta is one of  largest oil sands deposits 
in the world. There are also  sizable oil sands  deposits on 
Melville Island in the Canadian Arctic, and two smaller deposits 
in northern Alberta near Cold Lake and Peace River. Most of  the 
oil sands development to date has focused on the Athabasca 
deposit. 
Source: Energy Resources Conservation Board 
as  shale gas was begun in the past decade, although the 
construction of most of the planned  facilities is  still  in 
embryonic phase. 
Coal and solid fuels play a less important role among fossil 
fuels in the energy mix of  Canada; the relative importance of 
this fuel type in power production (16% in 2008) is less than 
that of  the EU-27 (21 %) and that of  the US (46 %). Canada only 
possesses 0.8% of the world's hard coal  reserves and its 
consumption amounted to 1% of  the world total in 2008. Although  the share  of  nuclear  fuel  in  Canadian power 
production (9%) is relatively modest, Canada was the second 
largest uranium-producing country in the world in 2009, after 
Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan's  world  share  of production 
amounted to 27.4% in 2009, compared to 20.1% for Canada. 
FIGURE82 
Canada's  uranium  production  grew  by  13%  in  2009, 
compared  to 62%  in  Kazakhstan.  compared  to  2008. 
Kazakhstan's rapid  production growth was a key factor in 
taking Canada's number-one position, which was unrivalled 
until2008. 
NATURAL URANIUM PRODUCTION (in tonnes) (2008-2009) 
Region/Country 
Kazakhstan  8 521 
Canada  9 000 
Africa  8 053 
Aust ralia  8 430 
Russia  3 521 
Uzbekistan  2 338 
USA  1 430 
Other  2 560 
Total  43 853 
Until 2008, Canada was the most important external uranium 
supplier of  the EU's nuclear reactors until 2009 when Australia 
supplied  21.6% of the  EU's  external  uranium supplies, 
amounting to 3800 Natural Uranium (NatU),  while Russia 
supplied 20.5 o/o  (3599 NatU) Clr'ld Canada supplied 18.7 o/o, or 
FIGURE 83 
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3.286 tonnes of  natural uranium. Beside these three countries 
Niger (10.5%) Kazakhstan (9.1  %) and South Africa & Namibia 
(together: 4.9%) could be deemed to be significant uranium 
suppliers to the EU In 2009. 
ORIGINS OF URANIUM DELIVERED TO EU UTILITIES (in  o/o) (2009) 
Other  5.8% 
Re-enriched 
tails  1.1% 
21.6 "o  Australia 
USA  1.8% 
EU  2.7% 
Uzbekistan  3.4% 
South Africa  20.5%  Russia 
and Namibia  4.9% 
Kazakhstan  '1.1% 
18.7%  Canada 
Niger  10.5  °~ 
Total = 17 591 tonnes of NatU  Source: Eurorom Supply  Agency Annual  Reporr 2009 Canada is a significant supplier of wood pellets to the EU. 
In 2002, 46% of  Canadian pellet production was exported to 
the US and 34% to  Europe. By  2008, exports to the  US 
doubled  but  only comprised  25% of Canadian  pellet 
production, while 58% of  the production went to Europe chat 
same year, including  the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark. 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland and Germany. 
By 2009 most of the pellet  shipments were destined  to 
Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands. In  2009, 1200 tonnes 
were shipped to the EU, satisfying about 15% of the EU's 
pellet annual consumption (8 millions of tonnes). 
FIGURE84 
Though plant capacity in Canada reached 2 million ronnes in 
2009, production did not rise appreciably due to the lack of 
mill  residues.  In  2009,  the impact  of  the Biomass  Crop 
Assistance Program in the US  provided US pellet producers 
with a $50/tonne cost advantage over Canadian plants. This 
advantage led to virtually zero Canadian exports to the U~ . 
The  fall-out in exports to rhe US  was  compensated  by 
boosting shipments to Europe that raised  the export share 
of the EU  market to 85% in 2009. In 2009 as a new market 
approximately  100,000  tonnes of pellets were  shipped 
to Japan. 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING CAPACITY, ANNUAL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF WOOD PELLETS 
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Sources: Canadian Report on Bioenergy 2010; European Wood Pellet Atlas 
As  the next chart shows, fuels  and  mining products are 
important trade goods between the EU and Canada. In 2009 
fuels and mining products  accounted for 15% (€2.7 billion) of 
all EU imports from Canada, and these products covered 7% 
(€ 1.6 billion) of  all exports from the EU to this country. 
FJGURE 85 
EU TRADE WITH CANADA {in EUR million) (2009) 
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Sources: Canadian Report on Bioenergy 2010; European Wood Pellet Atlas 4.3.  Qatar 
Situated in  the Persian  Gulf, Qatar plays  a  major role  in 
supplying many countries in the world with fossil fuels and 
possesses significant proven hydrocarbon reserves. According 
to the data In  the table  below, the country's  natural gas 
reserves amount to 28 trillion cubic metres (tcm), equating 
FIGURE 86 
to more than 140 years taking into account both currently 
operating gas production and planned facilities capacities, 
the latter representing annual capacity of 185.7 billion cubic 
metres  (bcm). Qatar's oil reserves amounted to 33.3 billion 
barrels which translates into almost 90 years of stock value 
assuming a daily production of  801  kbbl' '. 
QATAR, EVOLUTION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND RESERVES (in Mbbl, bcm) (2006 and 2008) 
OIL 
Annual production (Mbbl) 
Production to date (Mbbl) 
Reserves (proven and probable) (Mbbl) 
GAS 
Annual production (bcm) 
Production to date (bcm) 
Reserves (proven and probable) (bern) 
Although the Non-Oil and Gas Sector accounted for more 
than half of Gross Domestic Product (GOP)  of  Qatar in 2009 
(56.8%), both gas (24.5%) and oil sectors (21.7%) also play a 
major role in  the development of the country. QNB's data 
confirm the trend which could be first observed in 2008 that 
the gas sector overtook that of the oil sector regarding its 
contribution to the overall GOP. 
FIGURE 87 
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On the following chart the structure of  the energy production 
shows the relative Importance of natural gas production to 
that of  crude oil: 
QATAR, TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (in Mtoe,  %) (2008) 
Natural gas 
liquids  l o.s~, . 
Crude oil  33.7% 
55.8 •  Natural gas 
Total = 124.83 Mtoe  source:f:I OECDIIEA2010 
(54) Estimation made by  the Qatar  National Bonk. Between 2005 and 2009, Qatar possessed one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world with an annual average GOP 
increase of 17.4% and despite the looming economic crisis in 
2009 it was still able to deliver 8.7% in growth. Fast economic 
growth is coupled with a rapidly growing population, of20% 
per year. which was mainly due to the increase in number of 
immigrant workers the economy permanently needs. 
FIGURE 88 
Rapid  growth in energy  demand has  resulted  from such 
economic developments. which led to a doubling of final 
energy consumption between 2003 and 2008. 
QATAR, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1992-2008) 
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The main driver of  growth in final energy consumption was 
the  industrial  sector,  followed  by  transport  activities. 
Although Qatar's popula'tion grew rapidly in the last nve years, 
contributing  to a doubling of households'  final  energy 
consumption  between  2003  and  2008,  households 
contributed  only a  modest amount to  the overall  final 
consumption (5.2 %) during this period. 
The rapid growth in energy consumption might also have 
been influenced  by  fossil  fuel  consumption  subsidies. 
According to the World Energy Outlook 2010 of  the lEA the 
global  value of such  subsidies  in  2009  amounted  to 
$312 billion. Although Qatar's fossil-fuel consumption related 
subsidy expenditure is not extremely high in absolute figures 
in an international comparison, it spent 3% of  its GOP for this 
purpose in 2009. which cannot be deemed insignificant. 
5ource: e OECDIIEA 2010 
Qatar's gross inland energy consumption is broadly based on 
natural gas and gas liquids; almost 83% of the country's 
energy consumption is based on gas, reinforcing the role of 
lhis fuel. FIGURE 89 
QATAR, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe, %) (2008) 
Natural gas 
liquids  7.1% 
Crude oil  17.6 ''• 
75.3 a;,  Natural gas 
Total = 25.03 Mtoe  Source: «:l OE CD/IEA 2010 
Note: values under 1%  ore not  pr esented. 
The EU-27's trade with Qatar can be characterised as highly  the EU  mainly exports machinery and transport equipment 
concentrated  among certain economic branches. The EU  to the country. 
imports mainly fuels and mining products from Qatar while 
FIGURE 90 
EU TRADE WITH QATAR (in EUR million) (2009) 
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EU exports to Qatar represented 0.5% of  overall EU-27 exports 
while 0.3 o/o of  the EU-27's imports of products originated from 
Qatar  in  2009. These  relatively  low numbers  mask the 
importance of energy trade relations between Qatar and the 
EU-27.  In  2008  2.3%  of  the  EU-27's natural gas  imports 
originated from Qatar, increasing to 5% in 2009 according to 
transport 
equipment 
Source: DG TRADE 
preliminary data of  Eurostat. Qatar is the EU's leading supplier 
of liquefied  natural gas (LNG),  supplying 35% of all  LNG 
imports in the EU in 2009, compared to between 23 and 24% 
in 2007 and 2008. In certain EU countries (e.g.: Belgium and 
the UK), Qatar's contribution to LNG imports exceeded 50%. FlGURE 91 
EU-27, LNG IMPORTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (in %) (2009) 
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Besides Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Egypt 
were all important LNG suppliers to the EU-27 In 2009. 
Looking at the destination breakdown of  Qatar's LNG exports, 
it  reveals that the most important export trade partners are 
Japan,  t he  Republic  of  Korea  and  India,  altogether 
representing more than 57% of  market destinations. The most 
important European  partners are  Belgium  (12.1  %),  Spain 
(10.0%), the UK (9.7%) and Italy (3.2 %). 
FIGURE 92 
Qatar's LNG exports grew by 22 o/o In 2009, to reach 51.1  bcm, 
up from 41.9 bcm In the previous year. The volume of  annual 
contracted values to 2012 (103  bcm) presages further rapid 
growth In Qatar's LNG exports and makes It probable that 
it will remain the world's most Important LNG supplier In the 
near term. 
QATAR, MAJOR DESTINATIONS OF LNG EXPORTS (in o/o) (2009) 
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Total= 51.2 bcm  Source: Qatar National  Bank 4.4.  Libya (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 
Libya is an important supplier of  oil and natural gas to the EU 
due to its geographical proximity  to Europe and its fossil fuel 
reserves. Situated in Northern Africa in the neighbourhood of 
Tunisia,  Algeria  and Egypt,  the country is part  of the 
Mediterranean electricity grid, which has the potential to bind 
together a future integrated Mashreq-Maghreb power grid 
in the Southern Mediterranean. 
FIGURE 93 
Libya also possesses  the largest proven oil reserves of the 
African  continent and  it exports nearly 80% of its annual 
production to the EU, with Italy, Germany, France and Spain 
being the main Libyan oil importers. 
The trade dependence of Libya on the EU is very significant. 
Over 70 % of Libya's  total exports are  directed w the EU 
market while the EU  relies on Libya for less  than 1 o/o of its 
exports. In  2009,  more than  40 % of Libya's  total  GDP 
depended on crude oil exports to the EU. 
LIBYA, OIL EXPORTS BY DESTINATION (in %) (2009) 
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and  Czech Republic. 
In 2008,  10.2% of the total crude oil import of the EU-27  was the most important oil supplier to the EU-27. Provisional 
originated from  Libya,  which has become the third most  Eurostal data show that in 2009 the share of Libya in  EU-27 
important crude oil supplier ro the EU (compared to Russia:  crude oil import slipped slightly below 10% but  its third place 
32% and Norway: 15.5 %). Among rhe OPEC countries, Libya  in the import supply ranking order still holds. 
FIGURE 94 
LIBYA, EVOLUTION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND RESERVES (in Mbbl, bcm) (2006-2008) 
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Source:()  Petroconsulrants SA (2010) /rounded values) Libya is also a significant gas supplier to the EU, although its 
share in overall EU-27 imports is less than that for crude oil. 
In 2008, the country exported 10 bcm natural gas to the EU, 
representing 3% of overall EU-27 gas imports. The majority 
of this amount (95 %)  was  exported through  the  Green 
Stream pipeline to Italy, and the remaining 5% was shipped 
as LNG. 
In  parallel  with increasing energy prices, Libya's economy 
experienced  rapid  growth between  2004  and  2008, 
FIGURE95 
registering an average 6.2% annual GDP growth during this 
period according to IMF data. In 2009, a minor contraction 
occurred (2.3 o/o)  in the performance of  the economy as fossi I 
fuel prices became significantly lower as a consequence of 
the worldwide economic slowdown. 
The evolution of Libya's final energy consumption mirrors 
relatively rapid GDP growth in the last couple of years, and 
being driven  in  particular by  the  newly arising energy 
demand in other sectors (mainly services). 
LIBYA, FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe) (1992-2008) 
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Similarly to Qatar, Libya spent 3  o/o  of its GDP on fossil  fuel 
consumption subsidies  in 2009  that might have  also 
contributed  to  the rapid  growth  of its final energy 
consumption. 
FIGURE 96 
Source: e OECD//EA 2070 
The  next chart  shows  the  structure of primary energy 
production in Libya In 2008 according to Eurostat annual 
energy data. 
LIBYA, TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (in Mtoe, o/o) (2008) 
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Note: values under 1 % are not  presented. The predominance of oil is evident, given its 83% share in  inland consumption of  the country as a higher proportion of 
primary energy production. However, natural gas and liquid  oil production is exported than natural gas. 
gas respectively have a significantly higher share in the gross 
FIGURE 97 
LIBYA, GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION (in Mtoe, %) (2008) 
Natural gas 
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Crude oil  68% 
Total=: 18.42 Mtoe 
EU imports from Libya amounted to €20 billion in 2009 and 
exports  were equivalent to € 6.4  billion. The  majority of 
imports consisted of oil (85 %) and gas (13 %). EU-27 exports to 
Libya  were  dominated  by  machinery  and  transport 
equipments and other machinery producls (73 %}. 
FIGURE 98 
EU TRADE WITH LIBYA (in EUR million) (2009) 
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Source: DG TRADE Total primary energy supply - shows the share of  energy 
sources  in the energy mix.  It is the quantity of energy 
consumed within the borders of a country. It is calculated 
using the formula: primary production + recovered products 
+ imports +stock changes- exports- bunkers (i.e. quantities 
supplied to sea-going ships}. 
Total final consumption - (Mtoe) - is  the energy finally 
consumed  in  the  transport,  industrial,  commercial, 
agricultural.  public and  household  sectors.  It excludes 
deliveries to the energy conversion sector and to the energy 
industries themselves. 
Electricity mix - shows the share of the various energy 
sources used for electricity generation. 
Electricity generation - (TWh) - is the quantity of  electricity 
produced within the borders of  a country. 
Indigenous production - shows the share of energy sources 
extracted and used  from domestic natural  sources. The 
precise definition  depends on the fuel involved. 
Coal -quantities of fuels extracted or produced, calculated 
after any operation to remove  inert matter. In  general, 
production  includes  the  quantities  consumed  by  the 
producer during the production process (e.g. for heating or 
operation of equipment and auxiliaries) plus any quantities 
supplied to other on-site producers of  energy for conversion 
or other uses. 
Crude oil - quantities of fuels extracted or produced within 
national  boundaries.  including  offshore  production. 
Production  includes  only  marketable  production  and 
excludes any quantities  returned to formation. Production 
includes all crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGL}, condensates 
and oil from shale and tar sands, etc. 
Natural  gas  - quantities  of dry  gas,  measured  after 
purification and extraction of  natural gas liquids and sulphur. 
Production  includes  only  marketable  production, and 
excludes any quantities re-injected, vented and flared, and 
any extraction losses. Production includes all quantities used 
within the natural gas industry, in gas extraction, pipeline 
systems and processing plants. 
Nuclear  - quantities  of heat  produced  in  a  reactor. 
Production is the actual heat produced or the heat calculated 
on the basis  of the gross  electricity generated and  the 
thermal efficiency of  the nuclear plant. All nuclear production 
is set as fully indigenous. 
Geothermal -quantities of  heat extracted from geotherma  I 
fluids. Production is calculated on the basis of  the difference 
between  the  enthalpy  of the fluid  produced  in the 
production borehole and that of  the fluid disposed of  via the 
re-injection borehole. 
Biomass/Waste- in the case of  municipal solid waste (MSW), 
wood, wood waste and other solid waste, production is the 
heat produced after combustion and corresponds to the heat 
content (NCV) of the fuel. In the case of  anaerobic digestion 
of wet waste, production is the heat content (NCV) of the 
biogases produced. Production includes all quantities of  gas 
consumed in the installation for the fermentation processes, 
and excludes all quantities  of flared gases. In the case of 
biofuels. production is the heat content (NCV) of the fuel. 
Hydro- electricity generated by hydro power plant includes 
small hydro. Tide, Wave, Ocean power plants are  included 
as well, because Eurostat is using it  in this way. 
Wind - electricity generated by onshore and offshore wind 
power plants. Figures are set for the end of  2004, while there 
was a significant increase or  new  installed Wind Power Plants 
in 2005. 
Net imports by fuels (Mtoe) - share of all energy sources 
imported. excluding all nuclear, which is set as indigenous 
by Eurostat. Net electricity imports are included. 
Imports of crude oil  - imported crude oil divided by 
countries of  origin, EU-27 is counted without Imports  inside 
the EU. 
Imports of natural gas - imported natural gas divided by 
countries of  origrn, EU-27 is counted without Imports inside 
the EU. 
Imports of hard coal  - Imported hard  coal divided by 
countries of  origin, EU-27 is counted without imports  inside 
the EU. 
Final energy intensity- is calculated as final energy demand 
divided by value added at basic prices. For some industrial 
sectors, like the iron and steel industry, the non-ferrous metals 
industry and the engineering industry, it  was not possible to 
calculate energy intensity values. as the value added at basic 
prices is  not given for these definitions of sectors in the 
national accounts data from Eurostat. In contrast to primary 
energy intensity, final energy intensity does not consider 
the efficiency of  the energy transformation sector. C02  emissions per capita  - are  calculated as  total C02 
emissions divided by total population. 
C0
2  intensity - is  calculated  by dividing the total  CO~ 
emissions by the gross Inland energy consumption. It is an 
indicator for the carbon intensity of the energy system. 
Import dependency - net Imports of  a country or region 
divided by the sum of the gross inland consumption and 
bunkers of that energy carrier. 'All Fuels' shows the import 
dependency for oil. gas, solid  fuels, electricity and renewable 
energy sources in total. The aggregate 'renewables' considers 
all forms of renewable energy carriers, like electricity from 
wind or hydro  power as  well  as  biofuels  and  biomass  in 
general. A negative import dependency has to be interpreted 
as net  exports. 
Industry - the sector is defined according to the following 
NACE Rev. 2 codes: B (Mining and quarrying), C (Manufacturing) 
and D (Electricity, gas, steam and air  conditioning supply). 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Industry - the sector is 
defined according to the NACE  code CG  'Manufacture of 
rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral 
products'. 
Chemical Industry- the sector is defined according to NACE 
Rev.2 code CE 'Manufacture of  chemicals, chemical products'. 
Food, Drink and Tobacco Industry - the sector is defined 
according  to NACE  Rev.2  code CA  'Manufacture of food 
products; beverages and tobacco products'. 
Paper and  Printing Industry - the sector is  defined 
according to NACE Rev.2 code CC 'Manufacture of  wood and 
paper products and printing'. 
Services - the sector is defined according to the following 
NACE Rev. 2 codes: from G to S. 
Transport - the sector covers all types of transport {NACE 
Rev. 2 H 49-52). To calculate energy intensity the final energy 
consumption in transport was divided by the value added at 
basic prices of  the whole economy. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
API degree - American Petroleum Institute degree 
bcm - billion cubic meter 
Cap - capita 
CIF Price - cost, Insurance and freight price 
Dutch TTF- Dutch Title Transfer Facility 
EUR - euro 
EUR/bbl - euro per  barrel 
GOP - Gross Domestic Product 
GWh - gigawatt hour 
lEA - International Energy Agency 
LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas 
Mb/d- million barrels per day 
Mbbl - million barrels 
MMBtu- thousand thousand British Thermal Units 
Mt- million tonnes 
Mtoe- million tonnes of  oil equivalent 
MWh - megawatt hour 
NBP - National Balandng Point (UK) 
OECO - Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
OPEC - Organisation of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Platts PEP - Platts Pan European Power index 
pp- percentage point 
TJ - terajoules 
Toe - ton of  oil equivalent 
TSO - Transmission System Operator 
TWh - terawart hour 
USD - US dollar K
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